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Abstract  
This thesis examines the emergence of different business structure in Taiwan and South 
Korea. This thesis questions how, in very similar contexts, different economic 
institutions have evolved. In contrast to the political, market, and cultural perspectives 
dealing, the historical comparative institutional analysis adopted in this research 
suggests institutions alone could not explain the different business structure. In Korea 
and Taiwan, different business structure has emerged during the 1960s and 1970s, and 
this thesis considers three factors underlying their formations: political conditions, 
historical events, and industrial adjustments. The Chaebols in Korea, to a large extent 
are the result of a political alliance between the South Korean governments with the 
entrepreneurial elites to overcome their weak political support basis. Thus South Korea 
was, exposed largely to the leverages and influences of large business conglomerates 
which in turn benefited the growth of the Chaebols. In Taiwan, however, the business 
groups are the oucome of state policies in the economic realm. To avoid political 
challenges from centralized business groups, the KMT government in Taiwan distanced 
itself from the business sector and when necessary, exerted strong measures to restrict 
the business concentration. Thus, business structure in Taiwan are more diffused and 
balanced in its proportions. SMEs produce most of the export goods while the Large 
enterprises and State own enterprises produce the domestic consumer goods.   
 
This thesis pilots aspects of an alternative explanation, which aims to add additional 
explanation to the literature. Contrary to the prior conception of the institutional logic, 
the thesis concludes that growth of business structure in East Asia must incorporate 
attributes of historical and political conditions that support the entrepreneurial behavior, 
and the wider environment that serves to deter or reinforce risk-taking behavior.  
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Chapter 1  
 
Introduction 
It is important to study business structures in political science for the following reasons: 
first, business structure affects national income distributions; second, it affects the 
economic performance of a nation; and third, politics influence and shape economic 
activity and business, as economic action is socially specified and never simply a matter 
of cost-benefit analysis (Orru 1991). A comparison of South Korea (hereafter, Korea) 
and the Republic of China (hereafter, Taiwan) offers a ready example of what different 
business structures mean for a nation and how they are developed.  
 
Business groups are a central aspect of capitalism in both developed and developing 
countries. Such groups play dominant roles in the economic and political realms of 
widely divergent societies. This thesis examines the emergence of business groups in 
Korea and Taiwan, and questions how in very similar settings, different economic 
organizations emerge. In both countries business groups emerged during the late 1940s 
and became dominant actors in their respective economies in the 1970s – for this 
reason, the analysis is confined to this period. 
 
Theoretically, discussions in different business structures in Korea and Taiwan are 
based on the three theoretical approaches: neoclassical-oriented approach often referred 
as statism, the new institutional economic thesis, and the new economic sociology 
(NES), covering many of the substantive areas of old economic sociology but with a 
theoretical approach, which is fundamentally more eclectic and pluralistic (Powell and 
Dimaggio 1991; Swedberg 1994). 
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Some of more recent political economy literatures state the relationship between 
businesses sector and governments in Korea shared more of bilateral relationship than 
the unilaterally imposed where interplay between the government and business groups 
are found (Park 1982; Chang and Choi 1988; Kang 2002; Chu 1989). These literatures, 
although concentrates in Korea, suggests that Korea and Taiwan’s different business 
structure rest not only in their institutional difference, but also in many other factors 
such as political development, economic history and some even argues the cultural 
heritage 
 
This thesis will explain how different business structure developed in Korea and 
Taiwan. Using the literatures from variety of discipline,1and will account how 
businesses in Korea and Taiwan developed under the relatively similar political, 
economical and historical setting but produced different results. Studying how business 
develops in countries may seem of less interest to political scientists. However, I argue 
that studying how politics affects the structural difference in the business sector is 
important for the following reasons.  
 
First, the different business structure affects national income distribution. By having a 
different business structure, Korea and Taiwan have both experienced differences in 
how national income is distributed. Korea is the case where national income is unequal 
while Taiwan is a case where income distribution is relatively equal (Wade 1990). 
Second, it affects the economic performance of a nation. Having a different business 
structure, Taiwan suffered less from the 1997 Asian financial crisis compared to South 
Korea (Heo and Tan 2003; Heo and Kim 2000). Third, politics influence and shape the 
                                                 
1 For the research of this thesis, I have consulted literatures from political science, economics, 
management, and sociology.  
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economic action as well as businesses. The interrelationship of politics and business 
organization emphasize that economic action is socially specified and that economic 
action is never simply a matter of cost-benefit calculations (Orru 1991). 
 
Prior literatures in the NICs development focused heavily on explaining the 
governments’ influence in the different businesses structures in Korea and Taiwan, 
explaining how government in Korea and Taiwan set up institutions to deliver the 
uniquely different business structures in Korea and Taiwan. For this, the prior literatures 
have contributed in explaining how the different intuitional arrangements have affected 
the business structure in Korea and Taiwan. However, this thesis attempts to explain 
why different institutional arrangements have been embedded to Korea and Taiwan, 
thus bringing different outcomes.  
 
Rationale 
This study will bridge between the classical oriented literature and the recent 
organizational study. The study in the business structure in Korea and Taiwan is crying 
for more attention as there still unanswered question of why Korea and Taiwan 
developed a different institutional arrangements. This gap, I argue can only be filled by 
examining the question in different perspective. Thus, in this thesis, I attempt to 
conceptualize and explain the different business structure in Korea and Taiwan by 
providing a theoretical framework showing how institutional arrangements in the two 
countries have progressed over time by explaining how Korea and Taiwan reacted to 
three of the following factors: (a) political condition; (b) historical event; (c) industrial 
adjustment.   
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However, first priority will be given to the definitions and the important background 
information. The definition part will introduce and explain some of the less-familiar 
terms to the readers and the background information section will serve to account the 
similarities and the differences in Korea and Taiwan to set further discussions in later 
chapters.  
 
Definitions 
For this study, the small and the medium enterprises (SMEs) in Taiwan generally have 
paid in capital not exceeding NT$ 80 million; or regular employees not exceeded 200 
people (Fields 1995; MOEA 2005, SMEs/government).  
 
Cheabols refer to the huge conglomerate business tycoon in Korea. It is a south Korean 
form of business conglomerate meaning “business group” or “trust” in Korean. 
However, the word Chaebol is used frequently in the way “big business” is used in 
English. Some Chaebols are one large corporation, while others have broken up into 
loosely connected groups of separate companies sharing a common name. Even in the 
latter case, each is usually owned, controlled and/or managed by the same family group 
(Field 1995; Kong 1991). South Korea’s chaebols are often compared with Japan’s 
“keiretsu” business groupings, the successors to the pre-war ‘zaibatsu’. While the 
‘chaebols’ are similar to the ‘keiretsu’, (the two words are Korean and Japanese 
pronunciations of the same Chinese characters) ‘chaebols’ and ‘keiretsu’, there are two 
major difference between them. First, chaeobls are largely controlled by their founding 
families, while groups of professional managers control keiretsu. Second, while 
chaebols are centralized in ownership, Keirtsu are more decentralized and connected by 
corss-shareholdings (Kong 1993; Fields 1995).  
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A brief historical account of Korea (1945 to the early 1960s) 
With the end of the Japanese occupation in 1945, Korea was in chaos. During the 
colonial period, 1910-45, the Japanese government attempted to completely integrate 
the Korean economy with that of Japan. Japan introduced many modern economic and 
social institutions, and invested heavily in infrastructure, including schools, railroads 
and utilities.2 Most of these physical facilities remained in Korea after the Liberation 
but due to a lack of a managerial work force to run them, a shortage of raw materials, 
and instability in the political and social environment, the economy was in an extremely 
poor condition and never recovered to pre-liberation prosperity (Kim and Roemer 
1979).  
 
Contributing to further economic decline, the Korean War (1950 - 1953) severely 
damaged the economy by destroying most production facilities and killing 
approximately one million soldiers and civilians. During the post-war period 1954-61, 
the economy gradually improved. Gross domestic product (GDP) growth rate was about 
4.1 percent, although per capita income grew by only 0.8 percent per annum due to 
rapid population growth. The economic growth during this period was led largely by 
massive foreign aid, which supplied raw materials and capital goods to the Korean 
economy. It is estimated that between 1953-60, foreign aid financed more than 70 
percent of total imports, and contributed approximately 95 percent of foreign savings 
(Collins and Park 1989, p.167; Kim and Roemer 1979; Haggard 1988,1990; Corbo and 
Suh 1992).  
                                                 
2 Japanese colonial government did the same to Taiwan as part of its imperial expansion to the 
South. 
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Korea's unprecedented record of economic growth started in the early 1960s when 
government policy shifted away from import substitution towards export orientation.   
The Park regime, which came into power in 1961, committed itself to economic 
development and pursued comprehensive policies of trade reform and export promotion. 
The shift of development strategy from import substitution to export orientation was 
helped by the concentration of political power in the military government, which 
prevented any interference from interest groups, the legislation, and bureaucratic forces 
(see Haggard, Moon, and Kim 1991). Exporters were provided with extensive direct 
export subsidies and other incentives, including tax exemption, and export loans with 
preferential interest rates. In 1964 the government devalued the domestic currency by 
almost 100 percent against the US dollar, further eliminating the bias against export 
industries. The government also undertook a series of policies to encourage inflows of 
foreign capital to make up for the insufficiency of domestic savings.  
 
A brief historical account of Taiwan from Japanese liberation to the early 1960s 
Similar to Korea, the destruction and chaos of World War II and a subsequent war on 
domestic soil, the Chinese civil war, created substantial economic dislocation.  As was 
the case in Korea, the reconstruction tasks in Taiwan after the Japanese withdrawal 
were discouraging with 1946 industrial and agricultural production less than half 1937 
levels (Lin 1973, 37; Haggard 1990, 79). The island’s real net-domestic product in 1946 
was only 55 percent of the 1937 level and did not reach the pre-war figure until 1950 
(Kuznets 1979: 33-36). Taiwan in 1949 had a per capita income of U.S. $ 224 with an 
inflation rate of over 3,000 percent (Field 1995). However, by the 1960s, Taiwan’s 
inflation rate had dropped from 3,000 percent to 1.9 percent, and by 1992, official per 
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capita income had passed the U.S. $10,000 mark (Fields 1995; Cummings 1987; Clark 
1987).  
 
Economic problems were exacerbated by the harsh and repressive administration of 
Ch’en Yi (governed from 1935-1947), whose corrupt and brutal policies led to a local 
Taiwanese uprising in February 1947 and its subsequent ruthless squelching by the 
government. Economic problems were heightened further by the Chinese Civil War. 
When the Kuomintang regime of Chaing Kai-shek lost to Mao and moved to Taiwan in 
1947, the government was composed primarily of “Mainlanders” who were viewed with 
suspicion by the local Taiwanese (Gold 1986). The result was a nation in economic and 
social turmoil much like that of Korea after the Korean War.  
 
The extension of a U.S. security umbrella guaranteed the revival of Taiwan after the 
outbreak of the Korean War in 1950. A reconstituted Taiwanese government made an 
important decision to promote rapid economic development.  In the last 35 years, real 
GNP growth has averaged approximately 9 percent. Income per capita rose from $195 
in 1952 to just over $3,000 in 1985 as the economy was transformed from one 
dominated by agriculture to one dominated by industry. Once growth began to 
accelerate in the 1960s, the savings and investment rates grew increasingly higher, 
averaging about 30 percent of GDP during the 1970s and 1980s.  
 
Differences 
Despite prominent historical similarities between Korea and Taiwan, one can also see 
striking differences in business structure. While small and medium enterprises 
flourished (SMEs) in Taiwan as major employers and exporters, a gigantic 
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conglomerate-led industrial structure dominated in Korea. The structural differences in 
the business sectors of Korea and Taiwan are well documented in the literature on 
cross-national variations within the East Asian region (Chu 1989; Cheng and Haggard 
1987; Haggard 1990; Gerefii and Wyman 1990; Cheng 2001).  
Table 1 is a comparison of small and medium business sectors in Korea and Taiwan and 
clearly shows that the number of small businesses in Korea is less than Taiwan. 
(Table 1):Variations in Small Business Activities in Korea and Taiwan 
 Korea (South) Taiwan 
Number of SMEs per 1000 
people 
4.3 (1988) 6.7 (1986) 
SME share of manufacturing 
employer 
57.6 (1986) 70.6 (1985) 
SME share of manufacturing 
value-added 
37.6 (1985) 42.5 (1985) 
SMEs  share of manufacturing 
exports 
30.5 (1986) 60.0+ (1986) 
Park 2001, 847 
 
Although at late 1980s figure, the striking difference is visible. The ratio figure suggest 
that in Korea, about 2.4 less number of SMEs are present when compare to Taiwan. The 
real difference however is visible at the SME share of manufacturing employer and 
export sections. Here according to the table, SMEs share in Taiwan are nearly double 
the output of Korea. This indicates that in Korea SMEs play quite a limited role in the 
economic sector. SMEs in Taiwan on the other hand, played crucial role in creating 
employments and driving the economic growth. .    
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Table 2: Comparison of Korean and Taiwanese business groups 
Comparison of scale and centrality of Korean and Taiwanese business groups, 1983 
 Korean Top 50 Korean Top 5 Taiwan Top 5 Taiwan Top 96 
 
Equivalent  
U.S. $ (billion) 
 
68.32 43.98 5.28 16.48 
Percentage of 
GNP 
93.8 52.4 10.3 31.7 
Number of 
Workers 
N.A 446,906 126,279 330,000 
Fields in Maxfiled and Schneider eds. 1997, 131; Hamilton et al 1988 
 
Table 2 offers another interesting comparison. This time, the figures indicate Korea’s 
five largest conglomerates had total sales of U.S. $ 44 billion and employed nearly 45 
million workers in 1983. Taiwan’s top five companies, on the other hand, had a total 
sales ratio of 1 to 8.3 which is far less in quantity when compared to the top five Korean 
businesses (Fields in Maxfield and Schnieder eds. 1997, 131). This table indicates one 
thing clearly. In Korea, the economy is totally dependent on the performance of the 
business conglomerates most often refers as chaebols. This is indicated in the 
comparison between the scale and centrality of top 50 Korean business groups and top 
96 Taiwan business groups in table 2. Equivalent to the U.S. billion dollars, total figure 
up to 1987 in Korea is 68.32 while for Taiwan the amount is 16.48 (Fields in Maxfield 
and Schnieder 1997, citing Hamilton et al, 1987).  
 
The difference is clearer when one looks at the comparison of the figures for Korean top 
5 and Taiwan’s top 5 business group. Here, the difference is much higher where in 
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Korea the top 5 conglomerates contribute 43.98 and for Taiwan 5.28. This clearly 
indicates that there is a difference in the business structure in Korea and Taiwan. 
 
Further indicators do also indicate such differences in the business structures in Korea 
and Taiwan. First, Korea and Taiwan have experienced marked differences in national 
income distribution. In the case of Korea, national income is unequal while in Taiwan 
the distribution of income is relatively equal (Wade 1991). From an economic 
perspective these structural differences allowed the economy of Taiwan to suffer much 
less from the 1997 Asian financial crisis compared to South Korea (Heo and Tan 2003; 
Heo and Kim 2000).  
 
This thesis will examine the different business structure in South Korea (Korea, 
hereafter) and Republic of China (Taiwan, hereafter). In chapter one, the paper will 
review and discuss similarities and the differences in Korea and Taiwan in respect to 
their politics, history, and their unique business structure. Review of relevant literatures 
will follow in Chapter 2. Chapter 3 will introduce the underlying theory upon which this 
thesis is based, introduce the framework of the study, and posit hypotheses for this 
thesis. In chapter four, available primary and secondary resources will be used to 
evaluate and test the hypotheses raised in Chapter 3. Chapter 5 will summarize the 
findings and make concluding remarks. The goal of this thesis is to fill a gap in the 
political science literature by providing a meaningful explanation as to how business 
structures develop, as seen through a case study of Korean and Taiwanese industrial 
structures. 
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
 
Explanations of business and economic growth in Korea and Taiwan 
The following chapter will review literature relevant to Korea and Taiwan’s business 
and economic growth.  The review will highlight three theoretical paradigms: the statist 
or developmental paradigm (hereafter, statis); the new institutional economics paradigm 
(NIE); and the new economic sociology paradigm (NES). These theoretical paradigms 
are important as the majority of research on this topic uses one of the three theoretical 
approaches as the basis of analysis. In addition to reviewing the relevant literature, this 
chapter will evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of each paradigm and derive a 
modified theoretical framework that will explain the topic of this thesis better. 
 
The statist paradigm links differences in business structures in Korea and Taiwan to 
differences in their policy choice.  The NIE paradigm looks at how institutions develop 
and affect policy choices by explaining Korea and Taiwan’s differing business 
structures as an outcome of micro-economic differences in the two nations. The new 
economic sociology paradigm has originally derived from the new institutional 
economics paradigm. It is thought to be a more adaptive paradigm capable of explaining 
the differences in business structure as it takes into account the effects of socio-cultural 
macrostructures on economic structures without losing empiricism (Fields 1995; 
Swedberg 1994).  
 
The Statist Paradigm 
This section begins by reviewing scholarly literatures in East Asian newly industrialized 
countries (NICs). The neoclassical explanation for economic growth in Korea and 
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Taiwan relies on two basic arguments: (1) state intervention in NICs was lower than 
was typical of less-developed countries (LDCs) (Sach and Susan Collins eds., 1989; 
Cummings 1989), (2) a stable macroeconomic environment and a commitment to 
exports promoted domestic and international competitiveness (Gereffi and Wyman 
1990; Cheng 1990; Haggard 1999).  
 
The Former is the basis of statist arguments, arguing that such state intervention to 
augment the market signals was tendency found in the NICs in East Asia. The latter is 
the basis of the developmental theory arguing that the East Asian development was a 
result of states’ unequivocal macroeconomic measures. Both statist and developmental 
theorist emphasize that Korea and Taiwan had realistic exchange rates, lower effective 
rates of protection, and less governmental interference in the labor and commodity 
markets than other LDCs (World Bank, 1990).  
 
Literature by Alice Amsden (1989), Robert Wade (1990) and Stephan Haggard (1990) 
provide a reflection on the study of East Asian development and are centered on statist 
theory. Their work provides a basis of study for cross-national differences of industrial 
structures, thus providing a starting point for this study. Amsden’s (1989) focuses on 
Korea, while Wade’s (1990) focus is Taiwan. Haggard (1990) compares Korea and 
Taiwan’s developmental strategies and makes comparison with Latin American 
countries. In the case of South Korea, it is argued that elites have maintained their 
autonomy by protecting their country’s need for stability while maintaining an 
authoritarian regime. This authoritarian government has imposed suppressive measures 
on society in the name of economic growth. The free market economy, entrepreneurial 
investment, democracy and human rights have been overruled by concerns for 
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economic growth. Johnson (1982) and Amsden (1989) have argued that this measure 
was necessary to achieve rapid economic growth.  
 
Amsden (1989) proposed a new development paradigm, which she termed the “late 
industrializing model” (Amsden 1989, p.8). Late industrialization emphasizes learning 
as opposed to invention and innovation-the hallmark of earlier industrialization. In so 
doing, Amsden (1989) highlights two critical features of the Korean case: first, “the 
state intervenes with subsidies deliberately to distort relative prices in order to stimulate 
economic activity” (Amsden 1989, 8). Second, “in exchange for subsidies, the state has 
imposed performance standards on private firms,” (Amsden 1989, p. 8). These two 
features are made possible by a third, institutional, factor; namely, a strong state: 
“Industrialization was late in coming to ‘backwards’ countries because they were too 
weak to mobilize forces to inaugurate economic development,” (Amsden, 1989, 12).  
 
For Amsden, one special feature of South Korea’s industrialization is that the state 
intervened in the market with subsidies. Governments in East Asia, in general, have 
imposed performance standards on private firms in exchange for subsidies, (Amsden 
1989, 8). According to Amsden’s model, governments of South Korea, Taiwan and 
Japan have successfully maneuver industrial policy, intervened in market activities, 
managed private firms and carried out the role of an elder brother looking after and 
governing the market. A unique feature of late-industrializing countries such as South 
Korea is the disciplinary actions taken by the government to control private firms 
(Amsden 1989, 14). In Korea, to achieve economic growth, a division of roles between 
the government and the industrial sector have developed. It is argued that the state 
planned and initiated industrialization and industry followed their lead. The relationship 
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between the state and industry is hierarchical and top-down. Thus, in South Korea, 
economic growth and the resulting business structures were the result of strong 
leadership (Amsden 1989; Johnson 1987; Jones and Sakong, 1980; White and Wade 
1985; Wade 1988, 1990, 1992; Weiss 1995; World Bank 1993; Kim 1995). 
 
For Taiwan, Wade’s (1990) discussion is similar in focus to that of Amsden (1989). 
However, his primary objective was to challenge neo-classical explanations for 
Taiwan’s growth. Wade (1990) argues, “…The state in Taiwan has been doing much 
more than the neoclassical accounts recognize to increase supply responsiveness and to 
steer the direction of industrial growth” (Wade 1990, 73). Wade carefully examines the 
state, foreign trade and investment, domestic investment, industrial policy, the 
bureaucracy, the political system, and the politics of investment. He concludes that in 
Taiwan,  
 
“The government has acted to alter the social structure of investment profoundly, making it more 
conducive to industrial investment. Second, the government has affected relative prices in such a way as 
to…encourage investment. Third, the government has used a number of more direct methods to shape the 
investment patterns” (Wade 1990, 301) 
 
This is clearest in the case of Taiwan’s public enterprise sector, one of the biggest in the 
non-communist world (Wade, 1990, 301-302). Wade, like Amsden (1989), focuses on 
the ways in which the state has intervened positively in the market, shaping economic 
actors and the market to increase economic growth.  
 
Stephan Haggard (1990) used the term “East Asian mold” while contrasting the 
development experiences of newly industrialized countries (NICs) and Latin America. 
Those countries fitting the “East Asian mould” have a relatively autonomous state, a 
highly centralized and interventionist government, bureaucracy, and a weaker left party 
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(Haggard 1990, 115). Haggard believes East Asian economic successes have been the 
result of government export policies (Haggard 1990, 16-17). For Haggard, the success 
of Taiwan and South Korea is based on government policy, which enabled both 
countries to efficiently achieve a competitive advantage. Thus, enterprises in Taiwan 
and South Korea were benefactors of government policies and incentives, not a driving 
force of economic growth. Furthermore, it is argued that East Asian development is a 
result of authoritarian capitalism. The rapid economic development achieved by Taiwan 
and South Korea was possible due to the government’s strong role in suppressing the 
need for the distribution of incomes from the labor unions.  
 
Overall, these neo-classically oriented literatures on comparative political economy 
suggest that Korea and Taiwan’s success was due to the autonomy and developmental 
orientation of their states, which led them to promote exports and act as gatekeepers for 
foreign direct investment (FDI). According to the statist thesis, the difference in 
business structures in Korea and Taiwan is linked to differences in the governmental 
objectives of the two nations. Korea, to achieve fast growth, used government subsidies 
and competitive advantages to successfully control and manipulate the market thereby 
creating the chaebol structure. By contrast, Taiwan had a need for the political stability 
and equal-distribution of income which led the government to SMEs policy (Haggard 
1990; Amsden 1984; Park 2001; World Bank 1993; Wade 1990)  
 
The Limitations of the Developmental Paradigm   
The following section will demonstrate why the developmental paradigm is particularly 
handicapped in explaining the different business developments in Korea and Taiwan. I 
will comment on the theory of state-led growth and its theoretical assumptions of state 
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intervention or state guidance. This is to point out the limits of the statist theory in 
explaining cross-national variations in industrial structure, especially in Korea.   
 
The first problem with the developmental paradigm is its notion of the “visible-hand,” 
in which too much emphasis is attributed to the role of governments (Koo 1987, 165). 
Almost all literatures that highlight state-led development theory treat government as a 
sole independent variable and dismiss or simply ignore other variables such as private 
enterprises, international labor distribution and international political economy. In 
addition, internal economic conditions and activities of private entrepreneurs are 
minimized and treated as dependent variables only. This criticism is evident in Kuos’ 
(1995) argument which discards the developmental paradigm for a ‘tripartite-scheme’ in 
which economic outcomes are determined by differences in state-enterprise networks.  
 
The second problem with the developmental paradigm lay in its notion of a “strong 
state”. A nation is considered to have a strong state if it can pursue its policies.  This 
rather vague definition of a strong state has been much criticized (Shafer 1990). The 
term, “strong state” is relative and changes over time, according to social issues, 
government ideology and coalitions (Evans 1995). Shafer (1990) argues that the criteria 
for a strong and weak state are synonymous. It is hard to accept the explanatory value of 
‘strong state,’ when the criteria to be a strong state is judged by its end result.  
 
The developmental paradigm assumes that a strong government will be eternal and will 
have maintained predominant autonomy. This, however, is overly simplistic and 
misleading. Even if the government’s role in leading industrialization was effective in 
its initial stages, its role and effectiveness will erode as private firms achieve financial 
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and technological growth (Hobday 1995). It is evident according to Sakong (1993) and 
Johnson (1989) that the role of government in leading South Korea’s industrialization 
has eroded over time. The Korean government’s influence in economic affairs is now 
less evident than it was in the initial stages of industrialization.   
 
A third problem with the developmental paradigm is its top-down approach to 
explaining the relationship between state and private enterprises. This approach explains 
only the objective side of policy implementation while ignoring the real results of policy 
implementation as well as the process of financial accumulation necessary in 
industrialization (Kang 1995, 22).  
 
Fourth and the final problem with the developmental paradigm is that the period of East 
Asian industrial development and the structure of productions in the international 
economy strongly correlate. Koo (1987) argues that from the 1960s to early 1970s, the 
international capitalistic economy was growing. Many capitalist countries were willing 
to invest and lend money and interest rates were low. Trade barriers were relatively low 
for industrializing countries and these countries faced few challenges from other 
developing countries with respect to cheap labor. Lastly, the Vietnam War helped 
economic growth in both South Korea and Taiwan (Koo 1993, 169). 
 
To look beyond questions of state choice and economic efficiency towards 
understanding the relationship between politics and business structure is a daunting 
task. Nevertheless, it is interesting and important to understand the evolution of 
industrial structure, as it not only gives one insight into economic activities but also 
reflects the nature of politics. Scholars have attempted to conceptualize the politics 
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behind the market by incorporating such variables as the relative weakness of laborers 
as a group, successful land reforms, culture and leadership, the role of agriculture, and 
the limited role of foreign capital (see Deyo 1989; Cheng 1990, 1993; Burmeister 1990; 
Kuo 1991; Lee 1992). Identifying these factors is less difficult than conceptualizing 
them in a systematic way. In the following section, I will introduce two more theoretical 
approaches – New Institutional Economics (NIE and New Economic Sociology (NES), 
on which Karl Fields (1995) partly bases his framework. Both NIE and NES evolved in 
reaction to the developmental thesis. NIE grew out of neoclassical economics and 
deductive theory and assumes that economic actions are embedded in ongoing state-
society relationship. This means that the choices of both individuals and businesses are 
embedded in institutional settings, which emerge from societal settings.3 Developing 
from NIE, NES is more eclectic and pluralistic in its theoretical approach. NES covers 
many of the substantive areas of old economic sociology (Smelser and Swedberg 1994, 
18).  
 
Prior scholars have utilized all three theoretical approaches in explaining the different 
industrial structures in Korea and Taiwan: Amsden (1984) utilized and based her thesis 
strongly on the statist or developmental thesis. By contrast, Fields (1995) and Kuo 
(1995) based their writing on the NIE theoretical framework. However, I must add that 
while Fields’ study is oriented in the NIE tradition, the approach is more favorable to 
the NES approach. 
 
New Institutional Economics (NIE) 
                                                 
3 Karl Fields’ 1995 publication took exactly this approach by centering his argument on the new 
institutional economics while being flexible and incorporating NES approach.  
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The NIE paradigm counters the oversimplification found in neo-classical economics 
theory. In contrast to neo-classical economics, NIE shifted its focus from assumptions 
of the perfect rationality of actors to allowing for a greater range of human actions, 
including rational actions. Works by Williamson (1990, 1993, 1999) and others (North 
1990; Smelser and Swedberg 1994b) have made an enormous contribution to the 
subject of business organization.  
 
NIE draws on the analytical heritage of Ronald Coases’s work on property rights (R.H. 
Coase 1937; 1960). Nabli and Nugent (1989) divide the NIE literature into two 
components: (1) the transaction and information costs approach, which includes work 
on transaction costs, property rights analysis, asymmetry of information and principal 
agent problems (Coases 1937; Williamson 1999, 1993, 1990) and (2) the literature on 
collective action and rent-seeking. Clearly, there is considerable difference between NIE 
and classical economics in which the fundamental rule is that “actors are uninfluenced 
by other actors.”  This ideal-typical view of classical economics has been challenged by 
NIE. Perfect individual rationality is the fundamental assumption of neoclassical 
microeconomics. This assumption was challenged by Williamson who introduced 
Simon’s (1957) idea of bounded rationality into NIE.  
 
Williamson’s transaction cost economics (TCEs) approach is probably the most 
influential literature in NIE. In his institutional analysis, he focuses on explaining a 
business organization’s means of reducing transaction costs. Contracts and corporate 
institutional arrangement will evolve to overcome the uncertainty of transactions 
(Hamilton, 1999). The TCE approach of NIE is visible in the following literatures that 
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attempt to analyze the organization of firms in Korea and Taiwan (Choi B. S., 1987; 
Leff 1978;). 
 
 The NIE approach overcomes the problems of the developmental paradigm by reducing 
the state’s role in the development and organization of business structures. It provides a 
more diverse explanation of the orientation of businesses and is adequate and instructive 
for studying complex transactions and network orientation. Fligstein (1985) compares 
various theories of what causes changes in business organization from the unitary form 
(what he refers to as [U-form]) to a multidivisional structure (what he refers to as [M-
form]). According to him, this is caused by the cumulative effects of “control loss” 
which comes with increasing size due to transaction costs, bounded rationality and 
opportunism. The construction of courses of action depends greatly on the position of 
actors within the structure of business organization, which forms the interest and 
identities of actors (Fligstein 1990, p. 11). However, by treating institutional 
arrangements as efficient solutions rationally supplied to resolve economic problems, 
the theory cannot avoid oversimplification based on “assumed rationality”. This, in 
effect, precludes the inclusion of social, cultural and political factors, thereby causing 
the theory to move little beyond the neoclassical approach, which it claims to overcome 
(Powell and Dimaggio 1991; Granovetter 1992; Fields 1995; Hamilton and Biggart 
1988).  
 
Overall, the NIE literature argues that Cheabols in Korea chose to be multifaceted 
hierarchically organized business organizations in order to reduce their transaction 
costs. Although the approach of TCE’s micro-analytical level of analysis provides 
accurate and concise information about a degree of the organizational behaviour, the 
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theory is still bounded within the markets and hierarchy approach to economic 
organization. 
 
To paraphrase the development of Korea’s chaebol and Taiwan’s SMEs into a single 
phenomenon is too simple. The NIE theory leaves little room for comparative study and 
cannot effectively explain how Korea’s chaebols evolved to reduce transaction cost and 
why Taiwan did not follow in the same suit with more big enterprises.  
 
New Economic Sociology 
According to Smelser and Swedberg (1994, 18), the new economic sociology (NES) 
covers many of the substantive areas of old economic sociology but with a theoretical 
approach, which is fundamentally more eclectic and pluralistic. No single perspective is 
dominant in the NES. 
 
Fields (1995), recommends the NES as the most suitable theoretical framework to use 
when addressing business structure. Fields utilizes this framework for his work on 
“institutional-embbedness”, (Fields 1995; see Powell and DiMaggio 1991 for 
comprehensive explanation on the NES). Unlike the NEI approach, the NES examines 
the effects of socio-cultural macrostructures on economic structures, and emphasizes 
how historical and structural factors bring variation (Field 1994; Gerlach 1992; Orru 
1991). NES oriented research brought a new perspective to the study of Korea and 
Taiwan. Orru (1991), argues that institutional or “socially-constructed normative worlds 
in which organizations exist” shape and distinguish the organizational and inter-
organizational structures of firms in Japan, Korea and Taiwan. Whitely, (1992) in his 
comparative studies of business, concludes that the systems vary because of the socially 
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constructed nature of their market failure and because of significant differences in their 
institutional environments (Whitely 1992). 
 
Karl Fields (1995) describes the distinction of the NIE and the NES in a systematic 
manner specific to the study of business organization and his descriptions are applicable 
to the case of Korea and Taiwan.  
“…Institutional economics examines the effects of contracts and other micro level transactions 
on macrostructures such as vertical integration, and presents the possibility of an infinite 
universe of institutional forms, each most efficient in its own idiosyncratic context. In contrast, 
economic sociology examines the effects of socio-cultural macrostructures on economic 
microstructures and emphasizes how historical and structural factors in fact narrow the range of 
institutional forms that actually emerge in a given society,” (Fields 1995, p. 18).  
 
Fields (1995) provided clear but profound point because he ventures away from the 
middle ground of a “new institutionalism” based on rational market responses and 
cultural explanations for the development of embedded enterprise groups in Korea and 
Taiwan. His attempt to find the “nexus” of rational market responses, persistent socio-
cultural norms and state industrial policies is an admirable work, which initiated the 
passion of researching this topic.  
 
However, Fields’ work brings more questions than answers. In particular, his analysis of 
‘familism’ in explaining the growth of SMEs brings more confusion. I argue that, 
‘family network’ represented as ‘familism’ is also found in the chaebols in Korea. The 
head of the Group and his /her relatives control management of the firms and branches. 
Then, the value of ‘familism’ as an explanatory independent variable loses its values 
since both the Chaeobls and SMEs share common ‘familism’ value and the distinction 
between the Chaebols and SMEs becomes irrelevant as it can only explain similarities, 
but not the differences (Biggar 1997a, 18).  
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The other weakness of Fields’ analysis comes from his findings. Fields (1995) 
examined financial systems and their use by the state to implement industrial policy and 
argues that the institutional difference that have fashioned the very different business 
groups and trading enterprises in Korea and Taiwan derived from difference in their 
financial policy toward industrial sector. Fields (1995) found that the Korean state, 
which focused on rapid economic growth, achieved this by heavy subsidy of the 
cheabols and affiliated general trading companies. In Taiwan the KMT regime wanted 
to promote economic stability and prevent the over concentration of private capital. This 
is telling the same story using a different approach, moving little from what he intended 
to do. 
 
In addition, the picture Fields draws of the social and cultural context is not compelling 
evidence. He links peculiar Asian ties of trust or Chinese heritage to effective market 
relations and concludes that “this combination of formal and informal institutional aids 
to the market have clearly given East Asia an institutional edge over its Western 
competitors,” (Fields 1995, 244). However, I wonder why Korea did not follow the 
same path, if it is “Asian values” that determined the size and the scope of industrial 
structures in Taiwan. Why could Korea be the same? In addition, even if one 
differentiates Taiwan from Korea using “Chinese heritage” variable, the difference 
between the local Taiwanese and the mainlanders remains unanswered. If in Taiwan, 
“Chinese heritage” was a factor in determining the size of industrial structure, how can 
one explain the cleavage between the local Taiwanese and the Mainlanders? Both share 
the same Chinese heritage but the closer area studies of Hong (2001, 2002) reveals an 
ethnic difference between the local Taiwanese oriented in SMEs and the state own 
enterprises (SOEs) (Hong  2001, 2002 ). I argue that the problem lies within the 
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‘cultural perspectives’. Although cultural perspectives, in contrast to other explanation 
are in detail, often filled with elements of social life and social actions, the major 
weakness of the cultural explanation is that “culture pervades everything and therefore 
explains everything,” as Hamilton and Biggart (1988, 87) argued. Therefore, this thesis 
will avoid in examining the cultural aspects, as it will explain only the similarities but 
not the differences.  
 
Summary and proposed modification of ‘institutional-embeddedness’  
I argue that these problems can be overcome by examining the subject from a different 
perspective. Rather than studying institutions themselves as a means to understand the 
different business structural outcome in Korea and Taiwan, examining the institutional 
development along with the business development will give a better picture of why such 
difference had occurred in Korea and Taiwan. Simply put, I argue that study in different 
business structure in Korea and Taiwan needs a new approach; away from the 
traditional ways of thinking that is, the governments and institutions influence the 
industrial structure in Korea and Taiwan. In fact the relationship was more dyadic in 
Korea. Contrary to what the traditional studies have analyzed, businesses elites in Korea 
have also influenced the politics and institutions settings. But in Taiwan, one will see a 
more government influence toward the business sectors.   
 
Therefore, rather than studying institutions themselves as a means to understand the 
problem, treating institutional development as the focus of study would give much more 
fluidity in analyzing how different business structures in Korea and Taiwan came into 
being. More precisely, this study will look at differences in industrial structure in Korea 
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and Taiwan’s response through political conditions, historical events and industrial 
adjustments.  
 
This thesis will achieve the following two objectives. First, this study will elucidate how 
government policy responses to business structure are related to historical, economical 
and political relations. Second, the study will explain how Korea and Taiwan’s policy 
responses created the uniquely different institutions at the sate level as well as at the 
private level. This is because the prior literatures largely fail to account why Chaebols 
grew so large and powerful. Thus, I proposed a modified framework to account the 
progressive nature institutional-embeddedness where the interplay between the business 
sector and the government can be explained 
 
I argue that the institutional structures, especially the economic and industrial structures 
that have developed in relation to the growth of business through historical, economic 
and political conditions have played a major role in shaping the business structure in 
Korea. On the other hand, in Taiwan, such a relationship between the state and business 
groups is less visible as the KMT regime in Taiwan exerted strong influence to the 
business sector until the mid 1970s (Wu 2005; Chen 2001).  
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 3: Theoretical Framework 
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“Two broad paradigms-between which there has been remarkably little communication-have dominated 
thinking on the economic development of the NICs: the neoclassical view and the dependency 
perspective. Both suffer from the same weakness- they neglect politics and institutions.” 
 
      (Stephan Haggard, 1990. p.9) 
 
The weaknesses Haggard (1990) pointed out in this statement are now less visible in the 
NIC literature. The current weakness, however, is an over-reliance on institutional 
analysis as argued by Fields (1995). A fusion of neo-classical and institutional analysis 
dominates the debate on NIC development and growth. Fields (1995) observed the 
different enterprise structures in Korea and Taiwan and concluded that what made the 
difference was the “different state institutions” (Fields 1995, 23). Haggard (1990) also 
argued that it was institutional differences, which made Korea and Taiwan pursue 
different export-oriented strategy (EOS) and industrial structures. The institutional 
approach of NIE provides a useful understanding of economic growth and development 
phases.   In particular, the TCE approach within NIE makes a push to shift from state-
centric analysis to more organizational-centered approaches. As discussed in chapter 2, 
the NIE approach is still limited in its ability to explain the development of different 
industrial structures in Korea and Taiwan.  
 
Theoretical Framework  
This study is attempting to approach business structuring from a different angle. This 
study fits into the NES theoretical framework, as the eclectic orientation and the focus 
of the study derives from the ‘institutional-embeddedness’ This study modifies Karl 
Fields’ original framework to provide a better explanation of the different business 
structure in Korea and Taiwan.  
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Although similar in many ways, this study differs from the prior studies in two ways. 
The first difference is with respect to the angle of approach. Rather than accounting for 
the dominant institutional influences on the formation of business groups, this research 
argues that institutional development and business structure developed simultaneously 
in Korea. I contend that Korean businesses and institutional arrangements developed in 
parallel and mutually reinforced each other. In Taiwan, however, these parallel 
relationships are less visible as the KMT regime played dominant role.  
 
A graphical representation of Korean and Taiwanese differences will help elucidate key 
concepts throughout this thesis.  
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Diagram I) the “institutional-embeddedness” framework 
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The above diagram depicts cross-national differences in organizational and industrial 
structural as discussed by scholars within the field of comparative political economy in 
Korea and Taiwan (Amsden 1989; Chu 1989; Haggard, Kim and Moon 1989; Haggard 
1990; Fields 1995; Kim 1991; Kuo 1997 to name a few). Notice the linearity of the 
approach. The state institution or institutions are shaped by outside influences/factors. 
These “embedded institutions” then influence the creation of specific business or 
organizational structures. However, as depicted in the above model, there is no 
relationship between the business organizations and factors I, II, III. According to this 
approach, state institutions play a dominant role in organizational formations and 
creating the organization structures.  
 
The framework is clear and gives insights to a logical progression of how institutional 
difference affects different industrial structures in Korea and Taiwan. However, by 
assuming that state institutions are rational and that these institutions will have 
overwhelming control in policy decisions in the NICs, both the developmental and the 
NIE theories discount other important factors such as political conditions, historical 
events and industrial adjustments. Therefore, the NIE largely fails to account the 
progress of institutional development in Korea and Taiwan which, I argue, is important 
in understanding why different business structures have become embedded.  
 
This research thesis will argue that the development of business organization in Korea 
and Taiwan is much more complex than what the above diagram would suggest. The 
evidence of causal mechanisms is not always clear and often involves multiple layers of 
factors. In Korea and Taiwan, the factors presented on the diagram often run in parallel 
as opposed to top to bottom.  
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Diagram (II): The framework implemented by this study 
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and their respective economic strategies. In addition, factors (I, II, III) have influenced 
not only state institutions, but also the creation of business structures directly. Thus, the 
whole process is three-dimensional.  
 
The design of this study will pursue in following format. First, the thesis will examine a 
‘political condition’ factor which will explain why Korea and Taiwan has different 
industrial structure. I argue that weak political support basis for which the Korean 
governments from the First Republic to the sixth endured led them to form an alliance 
with only available societal-elites, the Chaebols which in turn enabled the Chaebols to 
be more embedded into the politics, markets and to society in Korea. On the other hand, 
such an alliance between the business group and government will be less visible as the 
KMT governments’ need for the political support was less visible as the regime enjoyed 
firm political power for four decades from 1949 to 2000.  
 
Then by examining the two micro-level factor of the Civil Wars and the development of 
semiconductor industry this thesis will explain why such a different business structure 
has developed in Korea and Taiwan.  
 
Methodology 
Empirically, one should be able to observe different patterns of business in similar 
systems, and similar patterns of business in different systems as Orru (1991) 
demonstrated in his comparative study of Taiwan and Italy’s small and medium 
enterprise systems. This study will provide evidence for the former claim- that different 
patterns of economic structures can be observed in similar systems. This study will 
employ the comparative historical case study approach, as it is useful in establishing 
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causal direction and illuminating causal mechanisms by examining historical sequences 
and intervening causal processes between independent and dependent variables. 
 
Functions of the Variables in this study 
 
Political Support Base (X1) 
The first factor, which this thesis will examine, is the political support base in Korea 
and Taiwan. Here, I will examine the political support base in Korea and Taiwan from 
the early 1950 and to the late 1980s. This will be measured by looking at the political 
development of Korea and Taiwan from their liberation to the time of their first 
democratic election.  To be more precise, this section will examine how governments in 
Korea and Taiwan obtained their political support basis. I argue that in Korea, 
politically weak governments of the First Republic to the Fifth formed political alliance 
with entrepreneurs to strengthen their weak political support basis. On the other hand, 
the strong KMT regime in Taiwan avoided in forming such an alliance with the societal 
elites to prevent them from challenging KMT rule in Taiwan.  
 
For Korea, I will examine the period from the First Republic to the end of the Fifth 
Republic (1948 to 1987). I argue that in Korea, the rise and the fall of the political 
leaderships in Korea until the fifth republic always have suffered from lack in political 
support base. To overcome such a deficit and to gain political support, the prior 
governments in Korea have relied heavily on the chaebols to overcome their weak 
political support base. This is because the societal elites in Korea were entrepreneurs. 
The state formed an alliance  
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In Taiwan, one will see less of such political alliance formation. The politics in Taiwan 
were stronger when compared to Korea. An expressed editorial in the New York Times 
in February 11, 1985: “…Taiwan is a republic only in name. One family, one party and 
one cause permeate its politics.” Since its retreat from China in 1949, the Kookming 
Tang (KMT) has continued to exert its aura until the democratization process hit 
Taiwan Island.  
 
The idea is simple. I will examine how societal elites have been established and 
embedded into the politics in Korea and for Taiwan, from the late 1940s to the late 
1990s. Here, this thesis will examine how chaebols became societal elites in Korea. For 
Taiwan, I suspect this affiliation with the business elites is less visible as the core KMT 
political ideology is based on equality and anti-business oriented from Dr. Sun Yet Sun 
and the KMT regimes’ political strategy to prevent political challenges.  
 
The impact of the Korean War and the Chinese Civil War on the distribution of 
resources (X2) 
 
The impact of the Korean War and the Chinese Civil War will be examined by 
examining the effects of the two Wars. I argue that the two Civil wars have brought 
changes to each country in the following ways: (a) the availability of U.S. foreign aids, 
(b) the distribution of government vested-interests returned to Korea and Taiwan after 
the Japanese colonialism ended. I argue that in Korea, the U.S. aids and reverted 
properties helped the Cheabols to expand their business and influences while in Taiwan, 
such variation is less visible.  
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Industrial adjustments (X3): 
I argue that the different business structures we see in Korea and Taiwan began to take 
their distinct shape in the mid 1970s. While both Korea and Taiwan has developed an 
excellent semi-conductor industry there is difference in the outcome.  
 
While both Korea and Taiwan started their semi-conductor industries during the late 
1960s (Hong 1997; Matthews and Cho 2002; Chang, Tsai 2000; Matthews J., 1997; 
Johnston 2000; Wu 2005; Byun 1994; Joo 1992; Wakabayashi and Sumita 1993), Korea 
sought to develop mass production capability for standardized memory products, 
DRAM, in particular, and  Taiwan sought its own niche market by emphasizing design 
technologies and Application Specific Integrated Circuit (ASIC) products.  
 
I suspect that such a difference in the manufactured products in the semiconductor 
industry in Korea and Taiwan indicates a different approach in the development by 
Korea and Taiwan. While in Korea, the development of semiconductor industry 
provided another excellent example of Chaeobl expansion and industrial concentration, 
the development of the industry in Taiwan will reveal more industrial diffusion and the 
growth of SMEs.  
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Chapter 4: State and the Business structure in Korea and Taiwan 
 
Introduction 
The first factor to be addressed is the political condition variable. In this section, this 
thesis will examine the relationship between the business development and political 
condition. I argue that the politically weak Korean governments sought alliance with the 
Chaebols in order to gain political support base by providing incentives to Chaebols in 
return for their political support. On the other hand, KMT in Taiwan enjoyed strong 
political power and less constraint by social groups.  
 
The second factor will address the historical variable by looking at how two Civil Wars; 
the Korean War and the Chinese Civil War brought changes to business growth and 
structuring in Korea and Taiwan. These variables are examined by looking at two 
indicators: U.S. foreign aid and the distribution of government-vested properties.   
An examination of the two civil wars will help explain significant changes in political 
economy in Korea and Taiwan. This thesis argues that Korea and Taiwan differed in 
their management and allocation of foreign aid and government-vested properties, the 
result being differences in industrial structure 
 
The third factor addressed by this thesis is the industrial adjustment. This variable will 
be examined by looking at the industrial policy response of Korea and Taiwan in the 
early 1970s. Preliminary research indicates that during this period, both Korea and 
Taiwan had launched their industrial adjustment policies. For Korea, it was heavy and 
chemical industrialization in 1973 and for Taiwan; it was industrial upgrading, mainly 
in the electronics sector. These policy implementations were Korea and Taiwan’s 
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industrial policy response to mounting external and internal pressures. Korea and 
Taiwan developed their semi-conductor industries and the purpose of this section is to 
present an articulate case study accounting for different developmental paths taken by 
the Korean and Taiwanese semiconductor industries.  
 
It is interesting to study how Korea and Taiwan have differed in their product 
specialization and industrial structures in the semiconductor industry.  I contend that the 
different business structures seen in Korea and Taiwan result from Korea and Taiwan’s 
different approaches to semiconductor development. 
 
The Political Outlooks: Korea and Taiwan’s’ Political Condition 
 
Weak versus the Strong: Politics in Korea 
The first factor, which this thesis will examine, is the political condition in Korea and 
Taiwan. Here, I will examine the political support base in Korea and Taiwan from the 
early 1950 and to the late 1990s and its impact on the business sectors in both countries. 
This thesis will pay particular attention to explain how different political condition has 
brought difference in their intuitional development and thus, difference in the business 
structures in Korea and Taiwan.   
 
The population in Korea witnessed several major crises that seriously weakened the 
legitimacy of the government from the establishment of the First Republic (1948) to the 
sixth republic (1987). The first crisis, celebrated as the April 19th student revolution 
virtually ousted the Liberal Party and brought end to Dr. Syngman Rhee’s largely 
corrupted government. Rhee stepped down on April 26, 1960. The second crisis is the 
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most widely known one. May 15, 1961, led by general Park Chung Hee quickly 
overthrew the second republic Yoon Bo sun and took over the government. Third 
political crisis in Korea happened in December 12, 1979 when major general Chun doo 
whan arrested the chief of staff general Jung Seung Wha, and overtook the government, 
which began the fifth republic. Political crisis and the abrupt changes of the 
governments in the history of Korea politics left the governments with weak political 
support base.   
 
Politics in Korea, from the establishment of her first Republic in 1948 to the end of 
sixth republic 1992, were never stable. From 1948 to 1987, Korea experienced seven 
major catastrophic political crises that resulted in either bloodshed revolutions that led 
to changes of the government. I argue these political crises were related directly to the 
problem in Korea; the lack of political support basis. The survey of political conditions 
in Korea from the first year of liberation (1946) to the end of the Fifth republic (1987) 
will demonstrate the volatile nature of Korean politics. However, more importantly, the 
volatile nature of Korean politics will explain why Chaebols become prominent elites 
from entrepreneurial elites to the societal elites in Korea and thus exerting their 
influences in politics and economics in South Korea.   
 
Weak versus the Strong: Politics in Taiwan 
In Taiwan however, the KMT regime have maintained unchallenged authority for over 
half century until the victory of Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) candidate Chen 
Shui-bian in the presidential election in 2000 (Wu 2001). It is well noted in the 
literatures that the KMT in Taiwan enjoyed substantial political autonomy (Haggard 
1990; Heo and Tan 2003; Gold 1952 cited by Haggard 1990 to name a few). Such 
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political autonomy KMT had enabled Taiwan to carry out wide-ranging reforms and 
political stability.  
 
This unchallenged political autonomy for KMT also enabled the regime to incorporate 
important social groups into the party organization; enabled the KMT regime to 
virtually control and exert [state-craftsmanship] within the Taiwanese society. Haggard 
(1990) notes few examples of such incorporations: “state-controlled youth corps”, 
which pre-empted independent student organization; the enforcement of the “state-
crafted labour unions” to both the private and public sector enterprises (Haggard 1990, 
citing Djang 1977). In addition, “Measures of handling of Labor Disputes during the 
Period of National Mobilization for the Suppression of Rebellion” of 1947 eliminated 
right to strike against local governments extensive powers in mediation and arbitration 
(Haggard 1990, p. 81). One more thing which Haggard (1990) notes is the KMT’s 
unconstrained ties with rural elites; enabled the government to carry out extensive and 
effective land reforms of 1949-43 (Haggard 1990, p. 81). 4 
 
Thus, the differences are now clear. The politics in Korea never had such autonomy and 
control that the KMT in Taiwan had. The ties with social elites in Korea determined the 
survival of the government while in Taiwan; the KMT was not constrained by such 
social groups. These two important indicators will serve to explain (in grand scale) the 
different business structure have evolved in Korea and Taiwan. I argue that in Korea, 
the weak political autonomy resulted in reliance of the governments on the social elites, 
the business entrepreneurs and later the Chaebols. While in Taiwan, strong political 
                                                 
4 The land reform in South Korea, however was a failure because the First Republic’s political 
support base came from the rural land owners. To appease them, the government in Korea used 
resources that were reverted from the former Japanese colonialism to appease rural elites in 
exchange for carrying the land-reform.  
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autonomy of KMT regime virtually were able to suppress the business elites to become 
too big to challenge the authority of the KMT and thus, more diversification in the 
business sectors were formed, the SMEs.  
 
The following section will provide detailed accounts of Korea (1946 to 1992) and 
Taiwan’s (1949 to 2000) political conditions.  
 
Never a dull moment: the volatile nature of Korean politics 
The story begins from August 15th 1945, when Korea gained her longed dream for 
independence from 36 years of colonialism under Japan. The significant modern 
political development thus began for the ‘Land of the Morning Calm’ when in 
September 1945, an advance party of the American Army, in full battle gear, landed at 
the western harbour of Inchon, and thus began the inauguration of ‘Operation Black List 
Forty, the United States’ occupation of South Korea (Hastings 1988). The occupation of 
the United States Military Government in Korea (USMGIK) had two major objectives: 
First, to smooth the transition of the governance from the Japanese occupiers to the 
people of Korea and secondly, to provide necessary guidance to the first democratic 
elections in Korea (McCune 1947; Nahm 1988). These two objectives were necessary to 
Koreans as the sudden withdrawal of the Japanese occupation left people in Korea 
virtually unprepared although number of politically organized groups survived the harsh 
Japanese occupation and was making their own preparation for the future of 
independent Korea. 
 
The first group was an organization of the leading capitalist and elites under Japanese 
occupation, led by Kim Sung-soo (the owner of Kyungsung textile company and Song 
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Jin-woo (CEO of the Dong A Ilbo, politician). This dominant right wing party (Korean 
Democratic Party) was supported largely by landlords, bankers, industrialists and 
businessmen. The other right wing party was the National Party headed by Ahn Chae-
hong. The National Party in its ideology was more moderate than the Korean 
Democratic Party. In addition, there were two major left wing parties. The two major 
left wing parties were the Working People’s Party of Yo Un-hyoung and Park Hon-
young’s Korean Communist party, which had a large number of labor and youth 
organizations affiliated with it (Scalapino and Lee 1972; Cumings 1984).  
 
It was about this time when the USMGIK occupational forces landed in Inchon. Major 
General R.H. Hodge, the commander of the XXIV Corps was in charge of USMGIK. 
Hastings (1988) notes “General Hodge and his staff were initially bewildered by the 
clamour of unknown Koreans competing for their political attention, and the disorders 
in the provinces which threatened to escalate into serious rioting…,” (Hastings 1988, p. 
17). These unknown Koreans were the leaders of the five political groups, each 
claiming their legitimacy to the political power in post-liberation Korea.  
 
However, contrary to their hopes in attaining political attentions from the USMGIK, the 
newly occupational force chose the Japanese. Despite the huge demonstrations and 
upsets from the Korean people, the first action of General Hodge was to confirm 
Japanese colonial officials in their positions, for the time being. Japanese remained the 
principal language of communication until 1946 (McCune 1947; Nahm 1988).5 In 
addition, it was during this time of government transition when Dr. Syngman Rhee 
                                                 
5 In the process, the USMGIK leaned heavily upon the wealthier Koreans and those who could 
speak Englsih. These comprised mainly of the wealthy elites, trained in the U.S. and civil 
servants from the former Japanese colonialism.  
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returned to Korea under the advisement of the USMGIK.6 Upon his return, Rhee wasted 
no time to form the united association of the Nationalist, displaying his talents in 
politics. Meanwhile, in late November 1945, Kim Ku, president, and Dr. Kim Kyu-shik, 
vice-president of the Korean Provincial Government in Shang-hai China, returned to 
Korea. However, Dr. Rhee and he two Kims did not find common grounds which 
resulted in serious problems within the right wing camp. Later, both Kim ku and Kim 
kyu shik was assassinated in late 1940s.7      
 
Then the birth of the First Republic under Rhee Syngman followed in 1948 with 
relatively weak political support base. By this time, all those who opposed Rhee were 
exiled or assassinated, leaving Rhee as the dominant leading figure in Korean politics. 
Syngman Rhee, then won the presidential election of May 10, with the help from his 
support groups (entrepreneurial elites) and the USMGIK. However, the public did not 
view Rhees’ government as the right form of government since the U.N. and the 
USMGIK giving Rhee the upper hand advantage by closely monitored the election. In 
addition, the result of election did not reflect the popular will as the electorate had 
twelve of unrepresentative list of candidates to choose from and the twelve of them 
were unopposed, including Syngman Rhee (Johnston 1948 cited by Weems 1948). 
 
Dr. Rhee Syngman, who portrayed himself as an exiled nationalist during Japanese era, 
never the less, won the support of the USMGIK and his loyal supporters (most of them 
the elites from the Japanese era). The National Assembly held its first meeting on May 
                                                 
6 Dr. Rhee Syngman returned to his native country as a private citizen. Number of other leading 
nationalists like Kim koo, the secretary general of the Korean Provincial Government in Shang-
hai, Lee Bom suk, chief commander of the Liberation Army were also granted to return but only 
as a private citizen.  
7 Also, Yo yun hyung was assassinated. Park hun young was forced to flee to North Korea and 
never returned. For more information, please consult the followings   
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31, and Dr. Rhee was elected as its chairman. On June 12, a democratic constitution was 
adopted, and on June 20, an overwhelming majority elected Dr. Rhee the first president 
of the Republic of Korea. On August 12, the United States government through the 
USMGIK stated: “it is the view of the United States government that the Korean 
government so established its entitled to be regarded as the Government of Korea 
envisaged by the General Assembly resolution of November 14, 1947,” (USMGIK 
1948, 96 cited in Sarafan 1946; McCune; Pak 2000).  
 
The birth of the first Republic in Korea reveals two important things for the purpose of 
this study. First, in Korea, the government was imposed by the USMGIK. Although Dr. 
Rhee had skillfully united the Nationalists to front opposition party, and the democratic 
election took place, all the procedures were under the auspices of the USMGIK.  
 
Second, South Korea never had chances to consolidate her own political agendas. The 
super-imposed USMGIK were decisive to implement the first democratic election and 
the creation of the first government, it virtually ignored the interest of the Korean 
people. The resentment of Korean people was epitomized in an editorial in the 
conservative Chosun Ilbo on August 31, 1946 (MecCune 1947, 16).    
 
When the U.S. occupation force ended the occupation, South Korea was political 
unstable, socially chaotic, and still economically bankrupt country. 
 
The weak First Republic: managing to create the political supports  
 As discussed in the prior section, the First Republic was politically weak, facing 
numerous challenges from the left-wing parties and other nationalists’ fronts like Kim 
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Ku who mainly opposed the United Nation’s plan to divide Korea to North and South 
and install separate governance.8 Challenges from the left wing party were the most 
radical. On January 24, 1948, an attempt was made by the members of South Korean 
workers’ Party to assassinate Chang T’aek-sang, Director of the Metropolitan Police of 
Seoul. In February, a Communist-inspired armed uprising occurred in Miryang, South 
Kyongsang Province, and in early April a large-scale armed rebellion of the 
Communists occurred on the island of Cheju, causing a large number of casualties and 
the destruction of more than 12,000 houses.    
   
Within this political turmoil, Rhee became the first elected President of the South Korea 
on the 15th of August 1948, and his political party Liberal party took the majority seats 
in the National Assembly. Then, Rhee wasted no time in forming his political support 
basis largely among the leading entrepreneurs and landlords, giving them unlimited 
political supports and economic leverages. During the process, however, re-enlisting the 
former collaborators to the Japanese colonial governments upset the population largely 
and there were nation-wide protests led mostly by the communists who were mostly 
went underground by this time. The famous example is Rhee’s appointment of Noh Duk 
Sool, the former Japanese colonial police officer charged with numerous accounts of 
killing nationalist activists through interrogation. Thus, Dr. Rhee and his government 
gradually lost more supports from the public and this led to closer ties to the former 
Japanese collaborators and entrepreneurs to win their support and overcome the 
weakness in political support.  
 
                                                 
8 An Doo Hee, lieutenant of the Korean Army, later assassinated Kim Ku.   
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These leading entrepreneurs were leading collaborators of the Japanese colonial period 
whom were dislike by the general Korean population. However, the group thrived under 
Rhee’s era and many of them later became the Chaebols in Korea later on. For example, 
the owner of Samsung, Lee Byung Chul9 This led to widespread corruption and 
virtually weakened the legitimacy of the Rhee government. Then, the state, under the 
leadership of Dr. Rhee and his close collaborators, did worse by allocated the aid 
entitlements and the reverted Japanese properties in exchange for gaining political 
support basis. Favored firms, whatever their origins, were allocated hard currency to 
import scarce materials-grains and fertilizers-that they then resold on the domestic 
market at monopoly prices. They were given loans at subsidized interest rates. They 
were granted tax exemptions, and they were awarded preferential contracts for large-
scale government projects (Kim, 1976, also cited by Amsden, 1984, 39). The magnitude 
of fraud is indicated by the size of the loans that the most favored firms received, loans 
on which they paid neither interest nor principal. A Government Audit Report, prepared 
in 1961 after the First Republic’s fall, suggests that total outstanding loans equaled 
about $140 million (or about half of the average yearly grant aid in the 1950s) 10 
Then finally, the people of Korea had enough and by the April 19 1960, the students 
took their resentment out on the street and the famous April 19th student revolution 
began which later involved public and leading intellectuals in the South Korea. This 
wide-raging revolution led to the end of the First Republic, giving birth to the short-
lived Chang-Myun government. By May 1961, the Major General Park Chung Hee had 
                                                 
9 Not all the entrepreneurs were former Japanese collaborators. Businessmen like Jung Choo 
Young and Choi Tae sub did manage to be successful without collaborating with Japanese 
government. But businessmen like Kim-sung soo and Shin were the leading collaborator, later 
were charged and lost their assets by Park Chung Hee.  
10 According to the Government Audit Report, quoted in park (1963), total outstanding principal 
on loans in 1961 was W 48,574,122,000, and interest was W10,271,000,000. Using the real 
effective exchange rate for 1962 (because the won was devalued twice in 1961), as calculated 
by Y.C. Park (1985), the interest and principal on these loans in dollars was about $140 million: 
Cited in Amsden). 
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successfully overthrew President Yoon Bo sun and became the unchallenged leader in 
South Korea for 17 years, giving birth to the Chaebols in Korea.  
 
The Military Rule: 1961-1971 
In May 16th 1961, a group of military officers carried out a coup and overthrew the 
Second Republic. The third Republic (1963-1972) appeared to be strong and 
deterministic to bring swift reforms, illustrating the governments’ strong puritanical and 
anti-urban tone (Cole and Lyman 1971). After the coup, all political parties, 
organizations, and unions were banned and the press was subjected to censorship. A 
revolutionary court was established in July to try those accused of various crimes, 
including the illicit accumulation of wealth, corruption, and hooliganism.  
 
In addition, Korea saw the creation of a new government agency, the Korean Central 
Intelligence Agency (KCIA) that began the task of screening 41,000 government 
employees, of which 1,863 were found to have been involved in corrupts and anti-
revolutionary activities (Cole and Lyman 1971). The junta carried out these extreme 
measures to bring centrality and necessary control in their governance (Amsden 1989; 
Cole and Lyman 1971; Haggard 1990; Nahm 1988). Despite all these extreme measures 
and political control, the junta lacked in one thing, which matte the most, the lack of 
popular support from the public.  
 
Since the revolutionary government came into office without the consent of the people 
in Korea, it was politically handicapped from the first place. The junta, however, 
realized such a handicap and made two significant moves to win the support of the 
domestic and the international opinion. First, to win the domestic support, the junta 
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arrested thirteen prominent businessmen and an investigation was launched into the 
activities of another hundred and twenty. The government seized all outstanding shares 
of commercial bank stocks and gained control of a powerful policy instrument. 
However, the thirteen prominent businessmen were later all released in return for their 
pledge of collaboration. On their release, the members of the newly formed Federation 
of Korean Industries submitted a plan to the Supreme Council identifying fourteen key 
industrial plants, including cement, steel, and fertilizer, in which they were interested in 
investing.  
 
Although such move may seem blunt at first place, it was a tactical maneuver catching 
two rabbits in one move. First, the revolutionary government did gain popular support 
from the public. Businessmen in Korea at the time were all alleged to have made their 
fortunes by affiliating with the Japanese occupational government. Thus, the arrest and 
confiscating their wealth won the popular support from the public since the First 
Republic never did it.  
 
The real catch however, was from the other one hundred two wealthy elites from the 
First Republic period. The junta made it clear that these wealthy elites are punished and 
their wealth confiscated. The prime example was Kim Ji Tae, former CEO of the Cho-
sun textile company and Pusan Daily Newspaper was charged by the revolutionary 
government of “illegal wealth accumulation” and bailed out by paying 54,570 whan and 
later in 1962 got charged again  (tax-evasion) and was sentenced to 7 years in prison. 
Thus his assets were reverted to government. With this, the transition from the old elites 
to a new ones occurred. The transfer from the old commercial capitalist like Kim Ji Tae 
into manufacturing capitalists occurred smoothly by this action. The government took 
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assets from the old capitalists by branding them as traitors and gained sufficient revenue 
to use as police instrument. The junta compromised with large manufacturing and 
construction firms (Samsung, Hyundai, Korean Glass Manufacturing, L.G. to name a 
few) and free them. This is because they need cooperation from the new entrepreneurial 
elites to revive the economy, the primary and the only viable means to win the 
legitimacy.  
 
The new business organization called for easier access to foreign capital, which 
demanded government guarantees. This became a central feature of government credit 
policy over the 1960s and 1970s, and foreign borrowing increased dramatically. 
 
Then, the Third Republic experienced its first political crises in 1964 and 1965, over the 
ratification of the treaty normalizing diplomatic relations with Japan (Kim 1971). The 
opposition leaders and student rose up and accused the government of taking a low 
posture and humiliating stand to the former colonizer. The opposition leaders Yun Po-
son, Ho Chong and others formed a pan-national committee to oppose the talk between 
South Korea and Japan; students in Seoul carried out demonstrations against the 
government resulted in many arrests and the resignation of Premier Ch’oe Tu’son 
(Nahm 1988; Kim 1971). Tensions aroused to of bewilderment and student 
demonstration became wilder and finally, in the evening of June 3, 1964 Marshall Law 
was declared in Seoul following clashes between thousands of demonstrators and the 
police (Nahm 1988; Haggard 1990). To meet the problem in hand, the government took 
remarkable measure and carried out another economic policy reforms. This included 
devaluation, tax and interest rate reforms, an opening to foreign capital, and the drive to 
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expand exports, which centered on the mobilization of resources, enabled the Chaebols 
to expand their businesses (Kim 1971).  
 
The Yushin Regime (1971-1979) 
Between 1966 and 1969, annual real growth averaged over 10 percent. Exports were on 
the rise, and the balance of payments situation improved. International competitiveness 
in labor-intensive industries, devaluation, the upswing of the world economy, and the 
Vietnam boom contributed to rapid growth and export expansion (Haggard 1990; Choi 
1983; Hong 1979; Cole and Lyman 1971). By the end of the decade, the Korea’s 
economy encountered new difficulties. The GNP growth rate declined from 15 percent 
in 1969 to 7.9 percent in 1970, and inflation accelerated (Haggard and Moon 1994; 
Brown 1973, 167; Hong, 1979, 107). 
 
The economic difficulties also exacerbated the regime’s political problems. Park’s 
decision to alter the constitution to allow for a third presidential term met wider political 
opposition in 1969. This undermines Park’s already weakened political legitimacy and 
the dramatic increases gap between riches and the poor contributed to the political crisis 
(Choi, 1988; Koo 1993). The bias toward heavy and the creation of general trading 
companies as legal entities produced high level of business concentration. Small and 
medium sized firms gradually lost their financial independence, either going bankrupt 
or becoming subcontractors of chaebols (Cole and Lyman 1971; Choi 1988). The 
government announced three measures to break away from such economic difficulty 
and gain a new momentum in the economic development phase. First announcement 
was the ‘freeze on private debt’. This measure in 1972 relieved the private sector, 
especially chaebols, of curb market debts (Choi 1983). The establishment of the 
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secondary financial institutions in May 29 1973 opened a new area of expansion for 
Chaebols. In addition, the introduction of the general trading company (GTC) system in 
the same year allowed Chaebols to secure numerous privileges-guaranteed letters of 
credit, loosened foreign exchange regulations, and further liberalization of import 
duties- and ensured the virtual monopoly of the Chaebols in exchange for the strong 
economic drive and political support. 
 
On top of this, the government announced its wish to expand the industry with the 
Heavy and Chemical Industry Plan (HCIP) in 1973. The decisive influence favoring the 
HCIP industry was military as much as economics (Haggard 1990). The American 
rapprochement with China, Guam Doctrine of the President Nixon, and the defeat of 
South Vietnam, and by Jimmy Carter’s announced intention to withdraw American 
forces from the peninsula have all contributed in Park’s decision to launch self-
sufficient economic and military development.11 Direct state ownership was the model 
in upstream petrochemicals and steel, as it was in Taiwan and the large Latin American 
NICs (Deyo 1987; Haggard 1990). In the electronics and machinery sectors industrial 
estates were built to house private-sector ventures (such as Kumi district). Specific 
projects were negotiated with the large industrial groups, usually acting with minority 
foreign-equity partners or under license. Protection and fiscal incentives were extended 
to the new industries.  
 
Thus, the HCIP was an expression of self-reliance and autonomy and Chaebols were 
fully realized to meet this goal (Woo 1991, 131). This is evident in the move of Korean 
government by heavily subsidized credit; guaranteed sales through government 
                                                 
11 A recent newspaper reported that Park, during the HCIP, tried to develop a nuclear bomb 
under secrecy from the United States.  
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procurement fostered the involvement of chaebols. Thus, by the end of the 1970s, a 
handful of the largest chaebols became dominant in Korean economy. By year 1978, the 
total production of the top fifty chaebols accounted 43 percent of the GDP (Woo 1991, 
131).  
 
The assassination of the President Park: end of the Third Republic  
On October 26, 1979, President Park Chung-hee was assassinated, bringing down the 11 
years of governance with him. The assassination, carried out by the President’s trusted 
aids, Kim Jae-kyu, director of Korean Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA). Then, the 
subsequent government of the Fifth Republic entered the political scene. Led by Major 
general Chun Doo-whan, also seized the political power through military coup known 
as the December 12th coup. The authoritarian nature of the political system made it 
difficult for Chuns’ Fifth Republic to distance away from Park Chung-hees’ third 
Republic (Suh 1982). Chun, made reforms and purified the Parks’ regime rather than 
revolutionizing. Thus, the economic policy and industrial planning did not change much 
and the ties with the Chaebols reinforced. This is reflected in Chun’s policy in 
continuing loan subsidies to Cheabols and often bailing them out when many firms 
needed help (Graham 2003).  
 
Summary 
From its first inception of the First Republic to the end of fifth Republic, the 
governments in Korea have suffered from many crises. Starting from the First Republic 
to the end of the fifth Republic, the governments in Korea suffered from the lack in 
political support basis. To overcome such a deficit, governments in Korea made 
political alliance with the one social group, the entrepreneurs in Korea. This social 
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group was influential and capable of delivering what the governments needed. For the 
First Republic, I argued that the entrepreneurs delivered political support and some 
economic growth, especially in the period of after war reconstruction.  
 
For the Third Republic, Park Chung hee formed strong alliance with the Chaebols to 
meet his economic growth plan (the first and second Five-Year Development Plans) 
which in turn guaranteed the expansion and the growth of Chaebols. The alliance 
proved particularly useful when the government pursued its HCIP industrialization. 
With the aid of Chaebols investing in HCIP, Park was able to take off the plan with 
relatively little political opposition. Chaebols in return received unlimited subsidized 
loans from the banks, which powered the growth of Chaebols.  
 
By the time when the Fifth Republic came into power, the influence of the Chaebols in 
Koreas’ political economy grew stronger. Chun realizing this had no choice but to 
comply with Chaebols. I argued that Chuns’ continuation of the loan subsidies to 
Chaebols and bailing them out from the debt proves Chun governments’ decency in 
Chaebols.  Thus, it is evident that in Korea, the Chaebols grew with Korea’s economic 
drive. Governments from the First Republic to the Fifth Republic depended heavily on 
the Chaebols to drive the industrialization of Korea.   
 
One Party, One Family: Politics in Taiwan  
 
The Nature of the KMT Government 
This section will examine the politics in Taiwan with particular attention paid to explain 
why the Koumingtan (KMT) regime in Taiwan has retained such a sporadic ties with 
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the business groups unlike in Korea. In Taiwan, the state always retained superior 
position against the business groups, able to exert ‘carrots and sticks’ measures to 
influence the business group much competently than Korea did. This was possible 
because of Taiwan’s political environment, which for four decades Taiwan’s politic was 
dominated by Kuomintang with virtually no political opposition until 2000. Taiwan was 
uniquely different from South Korea and Japan. The KMT was unique in three other 
respects. KMT posed an anti-business mentality (Haggard 1990; Wu 2005; Gold 1986), 
was a Leninist/quasi-Leninist party (Wu 2005) by inheriting the Dr. Sun Yet Sun’s three 
doctrine (Lin 1974; Chou and Nathan 1987; Cheng 1989), and was an economic actor in 
its own right (Wade 1991; Haggard 1990).  
 
In addition, the unique characteristics of the KMT regime and its vulnerable 
geographical position pushed political concerns to the top of the state’s agenda. Defense 
expenditure were geared primarily to the external political goals of the state and, above 
all, to securing the island against mainland aggression. Domestically, political rather 
than economic goals were paramount.  
 
As many researchers have pointed out, relations between the state and the private 
section in Taiwan differed greatly from those in Japan and South Korea (Wade 1991; 
Amsden 1984; Haggard 1990; Fields 1989, 1990 to name a few). The Taiwan state, for 
example, distanced itself from business, and there was almost no direct link between the 
state and the SMEs (Haggard 1990; Wu 2005) as argued in the prior section.  
   
First, I will examine how Taiwan’s post war state building process was different from 
the Korean experience. I argued, in Korea, governments from the First Republic to the 
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Fifth Republic (1948-1987) faced lack in political support basis and thus formed the 
unique business to state relation. In Taiwan, however, such business to state relationship 
was kept at minimal level and the KMT regime exerted strict control on the business 
groups to prevent the business groups to expand and challenge the regime stability (Chu 
1998). 
 
The Second Chance: Chiang Kai-shek and the KMT in Taiwan 
The KMT regime in Taiwan began in 1949 when Chiang Kai-shek retreated to Taiwan 
Island with his KMT supports and established his dominance over the KMT party 
through a party reform launched in 1950s (Tien 1989; Jacobs 1978; Haggard 1990). 
Thus, Chiang and his KMT members were able to establish a one-party political system 
on the island. Since most of the major KMT factional leaders on the mainland did not 
flee to Taiwan, there was a sharp decrease in intra-party power struggles, and the KMT 
was able to reform itself. Chiang Kai-shek dissolved the KMT’s Central Executive 
Committee in 1950 and in its staged set up the Reform Committee. 
 
Not to repeat the same mistakes, from the start, Chaing and KMT began their new 
political era without any opposition unlike Rhee and his first Republic in Korea. The 
other thing, which made a difference, is the fact that Chiang and KMT were 
autonomous both domestically and internationally. Internationally, The Cairo 
Declaration of the 1943 guaranteed the return of the Taiwan Island to China (Jain 1963) 
Thus, Chiang and the KMT remained neutral from the international intervention, 
allowing Taiwan to carry out reforms without losing her autonomy.  Domestically, the 
KMT was also unconstrained by ties with societal elites. The successful land reforms of 
1949-53 revealed the capability and the neutral status of the KMT government from the 
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social groups (Yang 1970). Thus, KMT in Taiwan started post-war era without facing 
strong opposition at domestic level, or interventions from external actors. The strong 
KMT determination to exterminate all those who oppose them was exhibited by the 
February 1947 incident. When the local Taiwanese leaders pushed the provincial 
government for greater participation in politics and economics, the KMT regime simply 
crushed the opposition (Haggard 1990 citing Kerr 1965). The other strong 
determination of the KMT was visible when in 1952, KMT attacked the body of the 
Provincial Assembly raised objection to the 1952 land reform. The KMT attacked the 
Provincial Assembly as a tool of the landlords and the assembly simply withdrew their 
opposition an thus began the swift reform (Haggard 1990).    
 
State’s Public Policy toward the Private Sector 
The regime’s political strategies encouraged the KMT to practice a policy of neither 
protesting and restricting the Large Enterprise (LEs) while encouraging nor restricting 
small and the medium enterprise (SMEs). The state fostered a number of LEs through 
protectionism during the Import Substitution Industrialization (ISI) period (Haggard 
1990; Wu 2005; Fields 1995). During the 1950s, by controlling imports and entry into 
business, providing credit through state-owned banks, and distributing foreign 
exchange, the state encouraged a number of private firms to become involved in import 
substitution production.  
On the other hand, the state vigilantly monitored and controlled the LEs, largely 
because native Taiwanese (Wu 2005) owned the majority of the LEs.  Wu (2005) argue 
that the state became increasing “wary” of the LEs when they first began to develop into 
business groups by the beginning of 1970s. Therefore, the KMT attempted to restrict the 
private sector in three ways. First, the state limited the scale of enterprises through laws 
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and regulations. The Company Act, for example, curbed the size of business operations 
by regulating reinvestment through equity flows between firms. These laws served to 
block industrial integration. Second, the export promotion policy was universalistic 
rather than particularistic. It kept barriers to entry low and made incentives universal. 
This differed from the situation in South Korea, where the state channeled resources-
particularly cheap credit to a few selected conglomerates to make them export 
champions (Woo 1991; Amsden 1984).  
 
Third, before the 1970s, the state blocked the LEs form expanding their operations to 
the upstream State Owned Enterprises (SOEs) industries and from participating in 
certain key sectors such as petrochemical, finance, and infrastructure (Haggard 1990; 
Wu 2005; Cheng 2001). These restrictions prevented the LEs from becoming vertically 
integrated conglomerates and affected the size of the business groups.  
 
The state’s policy toward SMEs shifted dramatically after the mid-1970s too. This 
change was triggered by the KMT’s legitimacy crisis, demands for political 
participation following Taiwan’s loss of its UN seat, and economic problems caused by 
the oil crisis, increasing international competition, and the growth in wages (Rubinstein 
1999; Chu and Lin 2001; Haggard 1990). To deal with these problems, the KMT regime 
suddenly discovered the SMEs (Wu 2005). They could further its Taiwanization 
scheme-the regime’s major tactic for thwarting political opposition. Their exports 
became increasingly significant to the economic growth that the KMT desperately 
needed as a new source of legitimacy in the wake of a series of diplomatic setbacks. The 
regime also viewed the SMEs as a significant force in its effort to check the growing 
influence of the LEs. Chiang Ching-kuo’s repeated emphasis on the importance of 
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promoting SMEs and his call for government officials and public banks to provide 
assistance to them were not promoted solely by economic considerations (Wu 2005; 
Jacobs 1979). Politics also motivated the state to move from a policy of benign neglect 
to one of active encouragement. Consequently, it implemented a series of measures 
aimed at promoting SMEs. 
 
Industrial policy of KMT 
Contrast to South Korea, where the state forged an alliance with the business group 
(chaebols) to gain its populace and political supports, Taiwan did the opposite. In 
Taiwan, the KMT vigilantly monitored the Large Enterprises (LEs) to prevent the 
emergence of political rivals. In addition, most of the important societal elite groups 
were incorporated into party organizations as mentioned earlier.  
 
All these phenomena had political origins. Political calculations came into play when 
the state set public policy toward the private sector. The top priority of the KMT was to 
hold and sustained the political power (Chu 1987; Hong 2001). For the KMT, as an 
exiled regime that had lost the civil war on mainland China, maintaining power was the 
first and foremost priority.  Thus, the KMT’s substantial insecurities about its rule led to 
restrict the large firms in order to prevent the rise of political rivals.  
 
Although it was economically irrational for the KMT to discourage LE exports, it was 
politically convenient. The second paradox was a consequence of the same political 
logic. Because of their size and fragmentation, the SMEs had little political might and 
presented no threat to KMT rule. Their treatment by the state matched their political and 
economic status: They neither were protected nor restricted (Wu 2005). These facts 
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suggest the importance of exploring the political basis for the state’s choice of an 
industrial policy and of examining the role of politics in economic development. 
Taiwan’s economic development cannot be adequately explained without considering 
the political factors. Therefore, this section addresses the political dimension of 
Taiwan’s development.  
 
Summary 
It is evident that the historical interplay between government and business 
conglomerates (Chaeobls) in Korea is different from the Taiwan case. I traced the 
political conditions of the Korea’s First Republic to the Fifth Republic to explain the 
origins of the Chaebols in Korea and argued that the government and business interplay 
resulted because the governments attempt to overcome their weak political support 
basis.  
 
In Taiwan, interplay with business and government is less visible. The analysis illustrate 
that in Taiwan, the KMT regime remained in strong power for four decades and faced 
less politically organized opposition. Thus, the KMT regime in Taiwan could exert 
more strong control and effective policy. I raised two examples to illustrate this point. 
First was the industrial policy of the KMT regime. I argued that the deep distrust toward 
the local Taiwanese prevented the KMT regime in Taiwan from forming a closer-tie. 
The deep distrust toward the local Taiwanese led the KMT government to monitor the 
Large Enterprises (LEs) to prevent the emergence of political rivals. Second, the 
political strategy of the KMT regime led the government to exert strong control toward 
the business sectors. I raised the example of the three policy measures as the example of 
this.  
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It became clear that there was difference in the overall political condition between 
Korea and Taiwan, influencing Korea and Taiwan to take different measures toward the 
business sector. Because of the political weakness largely derived from the lack in 
political support basis within domestic, the First Republic and the ruling party 
(Democratic Party) comprised with the leading social-elite group. This group comprised 
largely of intellectual and entrepreneurs were former collaborators to the Japanese 
colonial government. The majority of population viewed this as treacherous act and 
Rhee’s popularity decline since. To overcome such a deficit, Rhee and his 
administration’s dependence on the entrepreneurial elites grew more. I argued this point 
using the example of how the First Republic acquired its election campaign funds and 
provided ad-hoc institutional settings to provide advantages to early chaebols in Korea.  
 
The Third Republic, which came to power through the military coup of May 16th 1961, 
also suffered largely from lack of political support base. To overcome this deficit, the 
Republic promised to deliver economic growth and the general well-being to the 
population of Korea. To do so, Park Chung Hee depended heavily on chaebols to meet 
the goal. The economic institutional arrangements were geared toward to enable the 
business sectors to expand their operations from import substitution industrialization to 
the export-oriented industrialization. By providing limitless state-guaranteed loans and 
credits, Park enabled the Chaebols to grow beyond the Korean boundary and gave Park 
the legitimate reason to reign over in Korean politics for 13 years until his assassination 
in 1979.  
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The Fifth Republic followed similar procedure of the Third Republic and extended its 
loans and credits to Chaebols. By this time, chaebols grew to be so powerful that the 
government tried to control them by KAA act. However, as explained, the government 
largely failed to contro Chaebols. This is evident by the example of continuation of the 
subsidized loan flows to Cheabols and the government bailing out Cheabols.  
 
For Taiwan, such a weakness in political condition was less visible. Although the KMT 
regime in Taiwan faced number of crises that challenged the political ability, the KMT 
government dominated the politics in Taiwan for four decades. During its time, 
however, KMT did completely the opposite of what the Korea governments did. Rather 
than making a closer tie with the business group, the government distanced itself from 
the business sector and imposed strong policy measures to discourage business sectors 
to form an organized group. This thesis linked the KMTs’ stance toward business sector 
to the following two aspects: KMTs’ political ideology and industrial policy.  
The findings were as I suspected. The KMT regime in Taiwan by expressing itself as 
the “sole legitimate government” of China, remained in strong power by countering 
political opposition as exmplifed by the February incident and the strict control the 
government applied to the business sector.  
 
Overall, the politically weak governments in Korea sought business conglomerates to 
substantiate their weakness while in Taiwan, such a measure was not necessary as the 
KMT regime enjoyed strong political power and the government ran their own 
enterprises and controlled politics as well as economics.  
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Chapter 5: How Historical events change all 
 
The Korean War 
The war did not bring immediate changes to Korea but rather systematic and sustained 
changes in politics, economics and society. The civil war brought devastation for Korea 
and from the ashes, the country re-built society. On June 25, 1950, at approximately 4 
am on a rainy Sunday morning, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s (North 
Korea) Army opened fire on the Republic of Korea (Korea). Tank and infantry attacks 
along the 38th Parallel followed the opening barrage. At 11:00 am, North Korea 
announced a formal declaration of war and with this declaration the “Korean War” had 
officially begun.  
 
To most Koreans, particularly the war generations, the Korean War remains a grievous 
event. Grief and anger over the loss of family members and forced separations caused 
by the war still hover over daily life for the war generation.12 The war resulted in high 
human causality numbers for the U.N. coalition forces as well.  
 
However, the most important impact of the Korean War is that it reorganized Korea 
both externally and internally.  The War turned Korea’s international status from a mere 
benefactor of U.S. sponsorship from the liberation period to a U.S. sponsorship alliance. 
Signing of the “mutual defense treaty” (1953) marked a formalization of the alliance 
that still binds the two countries together up to today. The change of Korea’s 
international status brought exponential increases in U.S. foreign aid. The inflow of 
U.S. aid was beneficial to Korea in two ways:  first, they brought substantial income to 
                                                 
12 By war generation, I refer to the people in South Korea born prior to 1940.  
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the devastated Korean economy and enabled Korea’s economic rehabilitation. 
Secondly, Korean cheabols benefited substantially from foreign aid, which allowed 
them to increase their influence and power.  
 
[Table 3: U.S. Loans to the Republic of Korea from 1946 to 2005] 
 
Program Name 
 
Post-
War 
Relief 
Period 
1946-48 
 
Marshall 
Plan 
Period 
1949-52 
 
Mutual 
Security 
Act 
Period 
1953-61 
 
 
1962-
2001 
 
 
2002 
 
 
2003 
 
 
2004 
 
 
2005 
Economic 
Assistance 
(Total) 
 
181.2 
 
485.6 
 
2,579.0 
 
2,861.3 
 
0.3 
 
0.3 
 
0.0 
 
0.4 
USAID and 
Predecessor 
(Total) 
 
0.0 
 
10.0 
 
2,062.4 
 
1,080.3 
 
0.1 
 
0.0 
 
0.0 
 
0.0 
Economic 
Support 
Fund/Security 
Support 
Assistance 
 
 
0.0 
 
 
0.0 
 
 
1,861.9 
 
 
501.3 
 
 
0.0 
 
 
0.0 
 
 
0.0 
 
 
0.0 
Development 
Assistance 
 
0.0 
 
0.0 
 
0.0 
 
0.0 
 
0.0 
 
0.0 
 
0.0 
 
0.0 
Child Survival 
& Health 
 
0.0 
 
0.0 
 
0.0 
 
0.0 
 
0.0 
 
0.0 
 
0.0 
 
0.0 
Other USAID 
Assistance 
 
0.0 
 
10.0 
 
200.5 
 
579.0 
 
0.1 
 
0.1 
 
0.0 
 
0.0 
Department of 
Agriculture 
(Total) 
 
0.0 
 
0.3 
 
323.8 
 
1,739.5 
 
0.0 
 
0.0 
 
0.0 
 
0.1 
Food Aid 
(Total) 
0.0 0.3 313.8 1,739.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Military 
Assistance 
(Total) 
 
0.0 
 
12.5 
 
1,785.1 
 
7,005.4 
 
0.0 
 
0.0 
 
0.0 
 
0.0 
Economic & 
Military 
Assistance 
(Total) 
 
181.2 
 
498.1 
 
4,364.1 
 
9,866.7 
 
0.3 
 
0.3 
 
0.0 
 
0.4 
Source: U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), 1945-September 30, 
2006, Greenbook/ Country Report/ Korea 
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Notice from table 3, the dramatic increase in overall aid once the mutual security treaty 
was signed. U.S. economic and military assistance doubled upon ratification of the 
mutual defense treaty. From the period of Marshal Plan (1949-52) to the period of 
Mutual Security Act (1953-61), U.S. governments’ economic assistance extended to 
more than five times. Economic Assistance in total increased from 485.6 (millions in 
U.S. dollar) to 2,579.0. In addition, U.S. military assistance increased from 12.5 to 
1,785.1. The total economic and military assistance increased from 498.1 million to 
4,364.1 million. The U.S. sponsorship continues to play the dominant role until the 
2001 as the aggregate sum of total economic and military assistance given to Korea 
increases up to the year 2001. The evidence in table 3 indicates that during the year of 
Korean economic development (late 1950s to the late 1980s), the U.S. economic and 
military assistance played deceive role in the Korean economy.     
 
In comparison to the other countries that received the U.S. economic and military 
assistance Korea, during the 20-year period after the ratification of the Mutual Defence 
Treaty, Korea received nearly 8 percent of the U.S. world foreign economic and 
military assistance. U.S. foreign aid accounted for a total of $11 billion by 1973, higher 
than combined aid for the entire African continent (U.S. Agency for International 
Developments, 1974, U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants and Assistance for International 
Organization).  
 
The willingness of the U.S. to underwrite the financial requirements of South Korea’s 
subsistence and defense proved crucial in Korea’s economic development. The amount 
of economic aid that Korea received from the U.S. during the period from 1950 to 2001 
inclusive was equivalent to nearly 5 percent of South Korea’s total gross national 
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product (GNP) and nearly 10 percent of gross domestic product (GDP). This inflow of 
U.S. aid has also proved beneficial to growth of chaebols in South Korea. It is evident 
from a number of studies that chaebols like Lee Byung Chul (the founder of Samsung) 
and Ku In-hoe (Lucky Gold Star) took advantage of economic and political privilege 
resulting from US foreign aid in the post-Korean war era (Kong 1991; Lim 1999; Jones 
1989). Chung Ju-young (Hyundai) and Cho-Choong hun built their original fortunes 
from contracts with the U.S. military (Chung 1997).  
 
U.S. aid and the Chaebols in Korea  
For the United States, foreign aid to Korea was a means to carry out national foreign 
policy objectives. These objectives included (1) maintaining national security, (2) 
humanitarian efforts and (3) achieving national economic benefit. The weight given to 
these objectives differs for each nation given aid. The national security objective is 
perhaps clearest for countries like Korea and Taiwan in which the United States has 
provided assistance designed to enable maintenance of   military establishments capable 
of dealing with foreign aggressors seeking to overthrow the government. For Korea and 
Taiwan, defense support has been the major category of U.S. economic assistance, but it 
was also intended that foreign aid would raise both consumption levels and investments 
thereby contributing further to defense capabilities (Foreign Relation 1964-1968, Vol. 
XXIX, part 1, Korea).  
 
However, the close examination will show that the U.S. aids to Korea were beneficial to 
not only the growth of her economy, but also enabled Chaebols growth. The first 
evidence comes from the biographies by Chaebol CEOs referencing early 1960s to 
1980s as the period of unprecedented corporate growth (Lee, 1974; Chung 1997). The 
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Aids (from 1953 to 61) had provided both material and monetary necessities goods for 
them to expand their businesses in relatively cheap prices. In addition, the time was 
right for the entrepreneurs to expand their businesses from the traditional old 
commercial capitalism into manufacturing capitalism as the reconstruction from the 
Korean War demanded the production of both consumer commodities and industrial 
commodities. The government in Korea needed entrepreneurships to rebuild the society 
and for the entrepreneurs in Korea, this was a golden opportunity. Thus, local firms 
entered the intermediate and consumer goods sectors, including sectors such as cement 
and textiles (Haggard and Moon, 1994, p 62). Such an example will be Hyunday opened 
its cement manufacturing company in Dan Yang, Choong Chung province in 1962 
(Chung 1991) and Samsung opening up its Cheil textile company in 1954 (Matthews 
and Cho 2002; Kong 1991). L.G. concentrated on producing the rubber and plastics 
goods (Kong 1991) while Choi tae sub of the Korean Glass manufacturing in 1957 
(Choi 1995). 
 
The following section will look at how the U.S. economic and military aids have 
contributed to such cause. I will examine the trade policies of the Korea from Dr. 
Syngman Rhee era to identify how theses early chaebols acquired their wealth. The 
section will be divided into following section into two-separate period: (a) from the 
liberation period to the beginning of the Korean War (1945-1951) and (b) the 
reconstruction period to the end of the First Republic (1953 to 1960) 
 
The analysis will first start by examining the types and the purpose of the U.S. foreign 
aids to Korea. This is important because first, the specific types and the purpose of the 
 72 
U.S. aids indicates the specific policy of the U.S. in Korea and the second, the analysis 
will explain how the chaebols acquire their wealth.  
  
From the USMGIK to the Korean War (1945-1950) 
The primary focus of the United States military government in Korea (USMGIK) was 
stabilizing the devastated economy and introducing institutional arrangements to bring 
order to Korea after Korean independence from Japan. To achieve this, the USMGIK 
offered two types of aid to Korea. The first was “government and relief in occupied area 
(GARIOA)” and the second was “economic cooperation administration (ECA)”. The 
objective of GARIOA was to bring stability into Korea by raising the consumption rate. 
Thus, most of the aids were ‘consumer commodities’ such as food and clothing and 
agricultural goods to prevent hunger and disease. The objective of ECA was to extend 3 
years of investment to Korea. 
 
During Dr. Rhees’ governance, between 1948 and 1953, the consumer commodities aid 
accounted for three-quarters of all aid, half being agricultural commodities and the rest 
going primarily to fertilizer and petroleum products. Of the remaining project-related 
aid, only 16.5 percent went directly to manufacturing. Imported commodities were 
distributed to local firms for processing and industry. However, during 1948 to 1959, 
manufacturing scales were limited largely to three areas: textile industry, sugar 
productions, and flour productions. By 1959 standard, eight manufactures came to 
dominate domestic textile markets in Korea: T’aech’ang, Keumsong, Taehan, 
Chonnam, Choson, Kyungban, Tongyang, and Sambo. Some of these textile companies 
later expanded their businesses and became chaebols. To name a few, Keumsong 
textiles company later became SSang -Young (SSang-Young literately means Double 
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dragon in English), T’each’ang textile company later became Lucky, Kyung-nam textile 
company became Han-il group, Chae-il textile company later became the famous 
Samsung.       
For sugar production and flour production, there was Chae-il, which later became 
Samsung. (Chae-il had monopolistic control in the production of sugar and flours).  
 
As argued earlier, the aids Korea received during 1948 to 1953 were generally a 
humanitarian aids concentrated in boosting the domestic economy in Korea by raising 
the consumption rates. In addition, the strict U.S. control on the use of aid meant that 
Korea was limited as far as using aid to achieve economic growth. However, few 
managed to gain wealth from the aid.  
 
Despite restrictions on the use of aid, Korea’s chaebols did make a leap forward and 
expanded its influence by utilizing what was available from the foreign aid. One 
explanation for this expansion is found in the corrupt political ties between the Rhee 
administration and business elites during the first Republic. Chaebol success is said to 
have been primarily the result of corrupt quid pro quo between the state and the political 
capitalists. Access to foreign aid (or aid financed projects) and vested enterprises (which 
were typically acquired at below market prices and on extremely favorable terms) was 
only given to loyal supporters of Dr. Rhee. Those who received such access were in a 
position to reap huge monopolistic profits and often became overnight business tycoons. 
The argument above is based on the macro-economic policy explanation. Korean 
government under Dr. Rhee, in order to maximize the aid inflow, created such policies 
to lower interest rates, fixing the over-valued exchange rate, and a deficit budget 
financed by borrowing from the Central Bank. These policy measures produced an 
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internal gap between government transactions in financial sectors. Such a gap was an 
external financial gap between import demand and foreign exchange supply, the state, 
under the leadership of Dr. Rhee, and his close associates then allocated aid entitlements 
in exchange for political campaign contributions.  
 
During and After the Korean War (1951-1960) 
Following the Korean War, the UN Security Council offered Korea additional aid 
programs, Crisis Relief in Korea (CRIK) from 1950 to 1956, CRIK aid accounted for 
$4.9 million US dollars, of which 40% were foodstuffs and 24% were clothing goods (). 
The first package of aid helped the Republic achieve stability and saved thousands of 
lives by providing food. However, due to the focus of the aid program there were 
limited efforts to improve production or enable infrastructure growth. 
 
As illustrated in the table 3, After the Korean War Armistice in 1953, the United States 
expanded its aids program to Korea. Korea received aid from the following 
organizations: United Nations Korea Reconstruction Agency (UNKRA), Food and 
Agricultural Organization (FOA), International Crisis Aid (ICA), and Food for Peace 
(PL480). The United Nations initiated the UNKRA project amidst of the Korean War 
and then formalized the enactment by 1953. Approximately 65% of the aid was from 
the United States. The UNKRA concentrated on war reparation and construction and 
invested heavily in mining industries. FOA and ICA were similar to UNKRA but were 
under the control of the Mutual Security Agency (MSA).13 With the establishment of 
MSA, ICA and FOA programs merged and provided 17.5 million in total aid from 1953 
to 1961 (of which the United States paid 55.6%). FOA and ICA aid programs were 
                                                 
13 MSA was crafted to oversee the enactment of the Mutual Security Treaty of 1953. 
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semi-military oriented, providing aid in defense expenditures and infrastructure. The 
purpose differed from more economically focused aid and thus, had only minor affects 
economic growth. However, during this period too, chaebols managed to increase their 
expansion and production scales.  
 
This section attempts to provide an additional explanation for how aid affected business 
structuring, using the micro-level explanations. I argue that the Korean government, 
under the Rhee administration, sought to implement a government guided 
developmental policy and employed a growth model in order to create a self-sufficient 
Korean industry. However, this aim was rejected by the USMGIK, which instead 
pursued a policy to bring stability first (McCune 1947). However, Korea’s persistent 
efforts to develop its industrial sector is visible in Korean government documents, for 
example, in the report the Korean government made to the UNKRA on August 1951, 
the Five Year development plan, and the cabinet council’s decision ‘Basic Policy in 
National Economic Reconstruction’, were initiated. In July 1954, Korean 5 Year 
development policy was crafted for Rhee’s 1954 state visit to the United State.14 In 
these reports, it is evident that Korea was prepared to develop its industries by utilizing 
measures to deliver needed capital for development.  
 
There were two major institutional measures initiated to meet this purpose. The first 
was the ‘export-import link system trade policy’. This policy started in 1951. The 
entrepreneurs were given privileges in importing goods by exporting goods like 
tungsten and ores like iron and copper. Briefly, the government tried to designate the 
                                                 
14 These reports can be located in Korean National Assembly Library. http://www.nanet.go.kr. 
Since most of the original documents were written in combination of Chinese and Korean 
character, I got help from my father to translate the work. I would also like to thank my friend in 
Korea, Seoul who granted me an access through her identification and password. 
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goods that are imported by linking them to the goods that are exported. The government 
tried to import the goods that are related to agriculture (such as agricultural chemical, 
framing tools, petrochemical and fertilizers), finished products (such as vessels and 
various machinery parts), and raw and semi-manufactured goods (such as fur, fabric, 
crude rubber).  The government tried to expand its basic industry by designating the 
import goods that were not available through aid commodities. However, entrepreneurs 
at the time used this system to import popular consumer goods instead and subsequently 
benefited from their sale with huge profits during the War time.   
 
The other policy was with respect to compensation system trade. The aim was to 
encourage exports to other parts of Asia excluding Japan by letting entrepreneurs have 
freedom to import profitable goods to compensate for the export losses. From May 1952 
to 1954, increases in import goods accounted for consumer goods like sugar, papers and 
woolen products that were popular at that time. However, the Republics’ aim to develop 
a self-sufficient industrial sector was not successful except with respect to the expansion 
of entrepreneurs. It is evident that the first republic used private entrepreneurs to a 
certain extent to pursue its objective. By doing so, the early chaebols reaped enormous 
profit, which were then used to expand their own enterprises.  
   
The examination of these two institutional measures revealed three important facts. 
First, contrary to common beliefs, the aid provided to Korea until the 1960s did not 
significantly contribute to economic growth. The aid programs however, brought 
economic stability and large expenditures in the defense sector and the growth of 
manufacturing capabilities to meet the demand in consumer goods in Korea began. This 
in turn, brought business opportunities for entrepreneurs and with the risk taking 
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ventures and leverages from the government, the entrepreneurs in Korea began to 
expand. Early Cheabols, like Lee Byung Chul (the founder of Samsung) and Ku In-hoe 
(Lucky Gold Star) admit taking advantage of the economic and political privilege 
provided by the U.S. aid programmes. For example, Cho Choon hun and Chung Ju-
young (Hyundai) built their original fortunes from construction contracts and 
commodities trading with the U.S. military (Lee 1986; Chung 1997).  
 
Korean War and the distribution of the vested properties 
Chung (1989) has noted that the distribution of enemy (Japanese) property gave the 
state greatest powers of patronage of which the First Republic wasted through poor 
handling (Chung in Chung and Lee eds. 1989). Under the U.S. Military Government in 
Korea (USMGIK), the law dealing with reverted interests was passed in 1949, 
enhancing President Rhees undisputed executive control over methods of interest 
distribution (歸屬財産處理法, 1949 [Laws of Dealing with Government Vested 
Properties], article 39). 15  Primary and secondary literature indicates that large business 
legacies were left after the war in Korea According to Jones and Sakong (1980), the 
Japanese have left number of important properties for Korea to inherit. These includes 
Japanese productive machinery (along with an impressive infrastructure of 
communications and transportations), significant pool of skilled labourers, modern 
technology and industrial organizations, and lastly, small but growing export-oriented 
industries (Jones and Sakong 1980, 30) 
 
                                                 
15 The vested government interest/properties consists of the properties, enterprises, and interests 
that were confiscated under the United States Military Government in South Korea right after 
the liberation of the Korean people in 1947. For more detail, please consider the following 
publications: Lerory P. Jones and Il Sakong, Government, and Entrepreneurship in Economic 
Development: The Korean Case (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1980).  
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Overall, Korea inherited over 2,500 operating industrial and business enterprises, as 
well as infrastructures, inventories, real estate and 15 % of the nation’s land. The 
official count was 166,301 items of “vested property” (Jones and Sakong, 1980, p. 30; 
see also Timothy Lim 1999). Kong’s (1990) study suggests that it was during the 
Korean War that the distribution of reverted properties increased dramatically in Korea. 
Of the 2,029 vested enterprises sold from 1946 to 1958, less than 7 percent (based on 
value of Hwan) were disposed of by the end of 1952, by which time the most 
destructive phase of the war had ended. 
[Table 4: Distribution of the vested enterprises in Korea by year, amount and type] 
 [Unit: contract amount in thousand hwans] 
Year  Number of Cases Contract Amount 
1946 1 n.a 
1947 29 n.a 
1948 407 12,086 
1949 107 1,390 
1950 162 74,038 
1951 391 593,656 
1952 359 860,700 
1953 121 3,142,467 
1954-55 (a) 233 1,219,071 
1955-56 (b) 165 11,530,250 
1957 61 4,037,434 
1958 23 938,169 
Total 2,029 22,409,263 
Source: Lim 1999, 607 
Notice in table 4 that during the most violent years of the Korean War, a number of 
vested properties were contracted or distributed publicly. From 1951 to 1952, the total 
number of distributed vested interests was 391 to 395, respectively. This amounts to an 
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estimated figure of 36.9 percent of total vested properties distributed.16 In addition, just 
one eighteen-month period (July 1955 to December 1956), accounts for over 50 percent 
of all vested enterprises sold. Table 4 provides an odd account of  
 
The information suggests that it was during the Korean War when the government 
vested interests were distributed at large. In this respect, a number of questions come to 
mind. First, what were the criteria for receiving vested enterprises?   Second, what were 
the conditions required for receiving the vested interest? Was it based on purely 
political considerations, like corrupt relationships between business elites and the Rhee 
administration, as is generally implied?  Were other factors also considered such as 
managerial expertise or entrepreneurial ability? Third, why were the vested enterprises 
distributed during War time?  Kong’s (1991) study, on vested properties and business 
growth by 23 major South Korean capitalists, provides information to help answer these 
important questions.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
16 The calculation is based on the figures that were officially published. The original author 
(Kong Jae-Wook) suspect that there were more vested interests but since it was not recorded 
officially, the author was limited in estimating the full figure. 
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[Table 5: Influence of Vested Properties on the Business Growth of 23 Major Capitalists 
in South Korea (1961 figure)] 
Influence of Vested Properties on the Business Growth of 23 Major Capitalists in South Korea 
(1961 figure) 
Capitalist (Name) Influence of direct transfer of 
vested enterprises 
Influence of indirect transfer 
of vested enterprises 
Choe Tae Sup  Decisive  None 
Cho Sung-chul  None None 
Chun Taek-bo None Decisive 
Chung Chae-ho Some Decisive  
Chung Chu-young Some Some 
Lee Byung Chul Some Some 
Lee Chung-lim Decisive  Some 
Lee Han-won Decisive Some 
Lee Yng-Ku None Decisive 
Lee Young-bum None  None 
Ham Chung-hee Decisive None 
Kim Chi-tae Decisive Some 
Kim Chong-hee Decisive None 
Kim Sung-kon Decisive None 
Kim Yun-su None Some 
Kim Yung-chu Decisive  None 
Ku In-hoe None None 
Nam Kung-ryun Some None 
Paek Nak-sung Decisive  None 
Pak Du-young Decisive None 
Pak Hung-sik Some Some 
So Chung-ik Decisive None 
Sol Kyung-dong Decisive  Some 
Source: Kong 1993, 217-218; Lim 1999, 609  
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Kong’s study suggests that vested enterprises (in the period before the military coup of 
1961) played a decisive role in the growth of 15 of South Korea’s 23 largest business 
groups. Moreover, in only 3 of the 23 cases did vested government enterprises play little 
or no role (Kong 1993, 217-18).17 This is a good indicator suggesting that the major 
chaebols have largely benefited from the distribution of the vested properties.  
 
However, the information provided by Kong (1993) lacks precise statistical figures 
telling how vested enterprises were used or their productivity levels. Nevertheless, by 
considering the overall political and economic situation of Korea after the War, it is not 
difficult to provide a convincing explanation.  
 
The War itself brought destructions to Korean society as did the entire period of the 
Rhee’s administration. The domestic savings rate remained extremely low, as almost all 
government incomes (most of them from U.S. foreign aid) were spent on consumption. 
From 1953 to 1962, the gross average savings ratio was only 3.8 percent and with 
depreciation factored in the savings ratio was even worse. The net national savings ratio 
was actually negative, at -1.0 percent a year (Economic Planning Board 1963, 
Economic Survey, 17-18). It is not difficult to extrapolate that the remaining vested 
enterprises represented one of the few ways for the Korean government to invest in 
industry (beyond the level of traditional household production). In addition, the vested 
interests could have been used to subsidize the government’s payment to the war effort 
by selling stakes to entrepreneurs.    
 
                                                 
17 However, the original author did not provide clear meaning by ‘direct transfer’ and ‘indirect 
transfer’ in his study. Therefore, I had to second guess. I think what the original author meant by 
direct transfer means as subsistence of direct capital invested by the government. Indirect 
transfer I think means the literal way.  
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Another constructive explanation can be found in the political ties between the Rhee 
administration and business elites during this era. It is generally assumed that South 
Korea’s most successful entrepreneurs of the Rhee era (1948-1960) were purely 
political creatures, unable to stand, much less prosper, on their own. Entrepreneurial 
success is said to have been primarily the result of corrupt quid- pro-quo between the 
state and the political capitalists, whereby access to vested enterprises (which were 
typically acquired at below market prices and on extremely favorable terms) was only 
given to loyal supporters of Rhee.   In this view, entrepreneurial and managerial insights 
count very little as the main criterion for economic success was political loyalty, 
combined with a willingness to provide kickbacks and bribes to Rhee and members of 
the ruling party.  Many properties were financed with long-term (up to 15 years), low-
interest loans (Jones and Sakong 1980; Jones 1980). Given the country’s high rate of 
inflation, however, the real price on many vested enterprises ended up being almost free 
of charge.   
 
To summarize, entrepreneurs, like Lee Byung Chul, Chung Ju-yung, Chey Chong-hyon, 
Kim Sung-kon, and Kim Chong-hee, were not passive agents lacking control over the 
Korea’s scarce economic resources. Due to the positions they occupied in the country’s 
socioeconomic system, they were able to direct the flow of resources into their own 
hands, which, in turn, provided a foundation for their business empires. They did such a 
good job of exerting control over the allocation of government-vested resources that it 
took almost no time for this small group of highly capable entrepreneurs to transform 
themselves from medium-sized businessmen to industrial magnates with increasing 
control over South Korea’s economy.  
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The Chinese Civil War and Taiwan 
When one compares the post-Chinese Civil War experience for Taiwan to that of Korea, 
a number of similarities are visible. Both countries had fought against a communist 
regime and the burden of national defence continued upon the cessation of violence.   In 
addition, both Korea and Taiwan were recipients of a large amount of U.S. Foreign Aid. 
This section will examine the impact of U.S. aid in Taiwan. I contend that U.S. aid had 
similar impacts in Taiwan’s economy and military sectors. In this section I will first 
examine the kind of aid the U.S. extended to Taiwan as well as institutions created to 
use and allocate aid inflows. Second, I will examine the impact of foreign aid on the 
development of business structures in Taiwan to see whether different patterns are 
visible.  
   
The Evolution of the Nationalist Regime (1945- ) 
Chinese civil war (April 1927 to May 1950) occurred in mainland China between the 
Kuomintang (KMT) and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). The war began in 1927, 
when the right-wing faction of the KMT purged the communists and left-wing KMT   
factions within the KMT-CCP alliance. The war went on intermittently until the 
looming second Sino-Japanese war interrupted it. Full-scale war resumed in 1946 and 
ended in 1950 with an unofficial cessation of major hostilities and with the communists 
controlling mainland China (including Hainan Island) and the nationalist retreating to 
Taiwan. After KMT made their retreat to Taiwan in 1949, the regime faced the urgent 
task of rebuilding the state against a background of mounting international and internal 
difficulties. When Chiang Kai-shek retreated from the mainland to Taiwan everyone, 
including the Truman administration, anticipated that Chiang’s days were short (Chu 
and Li 2001). However, the outbreak of the Korean War on 25th June, 1950 helped 
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extended the Nationalist government reign in Taiwan for another half century (Cheng 
1976 Cummings 1989; Ho 1978, 1975; Wu 2005; Haggard 1990; Chu and Li 2001). 
The resumption of U.S. military and economic aid helped to stabilize and extend the 
control of the nationalist government in Taiwan. Beginning in 1950 and continuing until 
the late 1960s, huge amounts of U.S. aid flowed into Taiwan (Jacoby, 1966; see also 
Ho, 1984; Chang 1965).  
[Table 6: U.S. Economic and Military Assistance to Taiwan (1946-2005)] 
 
Program Name 
Post-War 
Relief 
Period 
1946-48 
Marshall 
Plan 
Period 
1949-52 
Mutual 
Security 
Act Period 
1953-61 
1962-01 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Economic 
Assistance  
(Total) 
 
502.3 
 
467.8 
 
978.8 
 
312.2 
 
0.0 
 
1.6 
 
0.6 
 
1.2 
USAID and 
Predecessor 
(Total) 
0.0 467.4 882.7 69.6 0.0 1.3 0.1 1.2 
Economic 
Support 
Fund/Security 
Support 
Assistance 
 
 
0.0 
 
 
178.3 
 
 
743.5 
 
 
0.0 
 
 
0.0 
 
 
0.0 
 
 
0.0 
 
 
0.0 
Development 
Assistance 
 
0.0 
 
0.0 
 
0.0 
 
0.0 
 
0.0 
 
0.0 
 
0.0 
 
1.2 
Child Survival 
& Health 
 
0.0 
 
0.0 
 
0.0 
 
0.0 
 
0.0 
 
0.0 
 
0.0 
 
0.0 
Other USAID 
Assistance 
 
0.0 
 
289.1 
 
139.2 
 
69.6 
 
0.0 
 
1.3 
 
0.1 
 
0.0 
Department of 
Agriculture 
(Total) 
 
0.0 
 
0.4 
 
96.1 
 
241.7 
 
0.0 
 
0.0 
 
0.0 
 
0.0 
Food Aid 
(Total) 
0.0 0.4 96.1 241.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Military 
Assistance 
(Total) 
 
141.4 
 
275.3 
 
2,060.2 
 
1,891.4 
 
0.0 
 
0.0 
 
0.0 
 
0.0 
Economic & 
Military 
Assistance 
(Total) 
 
643.7 
 
743.1 
 
3,039.0 
 
2,203.6 
 
0.1 
 
1.6 
 
0.6 
 
1.2 
Source: U.S. Agency for International Development, Greenbook, 1945-September 30, 
2006, Country Report/ Taiwan/ 
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As the table 7 indicates, from 1949 to 1967, Taiwan received over $ 4.1 billion in U.S. 
aid of which $2.4 billion was U.S. military assistance. During 1949 to 1967, Taiwan 
received US$ 425 for every member of its civilian population and, excluding military 
assistance, economic aid received per capita was US$ 187. Cummings (1984) 
comparing Taiwan to Korea argued, “Since 1945, Taiwan received some $5.6 million of 
American military and economic aid, ($600 per capita in the Korea, $425 per capita in 
Taiwan)”. U.S. military deliveries to Korea and Taiwan (1955-78) (that is, excluding 
the Korean War) totalled $9.05 billion. All of Latin American and Africa received $3.2 
billions; only Iran received more aid ($10.01 billion), most of which was received after 
1972 (Jacoby 1966 cited by Ho 1978, p. 111). Notice in table 7, however, the amount of 
Economic Assistance is significantly reduced from the year of 1962 (from 978.8 million 
to only 312.2 million). In addition, the total Military Assistance also was reduced from 
2,060.2 million to 1,891.4 from 1962 and then significantly reduced from the year 2002.  
 
U.S. Aid and business development in Taiwan 
Foreign aid allowed Taiwan to better meet its economic and military needs. Aid 
permitted Taiwan to grow and to remain relatively stable while maintaining an 
unusually large military establishment. U.S. aid helped to lessen conflicts that existed in 
Taiwan’s economic development by controlling inflation, relaxing foreign exchange 
restraints, and permitting a high level of capital formation (Ho 1978,1980,1981,1987; 
Chang 1965; Amsden 1989; Jacoby 1965; Chen 2000; Haggard 1990; Wu 2005).  
 
From 1951 to 1965, U.S. economic aid to Taiwan totalled $1.465 billion, an average of 
$100 million a year. The aid represented 5 to 10 percent of Taiwan’s GNP per annum 
during this period. The aid averaged 34 percent of total gross investment and covered 
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roughly 90 percent of Taiwan’s net import surplus of goods and services (Jacoby 1966, 
p. 53)18. The fifteen-year U.S. assistance program to Taiwan can be divided into three 
phases. The first phase was from 1951 to 1956, when most   aid   consisted of defense 
support, technical cooperation, and direct forces support. The U.S. agency responsible 
for the program was the Mutual Security Administration (MSA).19 Most assistance was 
given as grants and commodity goods. The second phase was from 1957 to 1960. 
During this period surplus agricultural commodities and a “Development Loan Fund” 
were added. The aid was administered by the International Cooperation Administration 
(ICA) and came in the form of both loans and grants. The third phase was from 1961 to 
1966. During this period, development assistance replaced general assistance and loans 
were the major form of assistance. The program became the responsibility of the 
Agency for International Development (AID) (Lieu 1978 cited in Wu, 2005, 113).  
 
The aid recipients did not receive U.S. currency but were given commodities and 
services of an equivalent value. Deposits of New Taiwan dollars were made to a special 
account in the name of the Government of the Taiwan for use on projects mutually 
agreed to by the United States and Taiwanese governments. The aid-generated NT 
dollars were known as the “Counterpart Fund.”  Between 1951 and 1965, the total in the 
fund amounted to just under NT$33 billion, roughly U.S.$825 million (Wen 1978, 137, 
cited by Wu, 2005, 113). About 64 percent of the available aid-generated local currency 
was used for development purposes; the remaining 36 percent was used to support the 
military budget (Jacoby, 1966, 48 cited by Wu, 2005, 113). Roughly, 80 percent of U.S. 
economic aid went to the government (90 percent if military assistance is included).  
                                                 
18 Used standard calculation of GNP. GNP= GDP at factor cost + net property income from 
abroad.  
19 Similar to the Korean case. 
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For the Taiwanese government, the enormous amount of U.S. aid was both a vital 
resources and an important policy instrument (Chang 1965). One main concern was 
furthering the governments’ economic and political goals through the distribution of 
assistance. The use of U.S. aid was regulated by bilateral agreements between the two 
governments and by the U.S. law requiring aid to serve American interests. These 
restrictions might have given Taiwan and its KMT government only limited room to 
exert discretion (see for example Jacoby 1965; Wu 2005; Chang 1964). However, 
within its scope of permitted autonomy, the KMT government tried to use the 
distribution of aid to serve its economic and political goals.  
 
The aid had a strong impact on state autonomy and capacity in Taiwan. On the one 
hand, it helped strengthen the autonomy of the Taiwanese government by providing 
huge financial and material support. On the other hand, the aid made Taiwan dependent 
on the United States, politically, militarily, and economically. The aid simultaneously 
increased the KMT’s internal autonomy and its external dependency (similar situation 
occurred in Korea.). This paradoxical impact was also reflected in state-private sector 
relationships. The state was able to influence private sector investment through 
allocation of aid (contrary to Korea where the state depended on private sectors incomes 
to subsidize development).  
 
According to Wu (2005), the inflow of U.S. aid influenced the state structure in Taiwan 
as well. The aid helped increase the authority and power of the KMT regime and 
contributed to the development of Taiwan’s unique industrial structure (Jacoby 1965; 
Ho 1987). First, it helped to reinforce state own enterprises (SOEs), particularly those in 
the infrastructure. 85 percent of U.S. assistance went to the public sector which reflects 
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the common goal of bring stability to Taiwan, held by both the U.S. and Taiwanese 
governments (Wu 2005 citing Ho 1980, 1987). Aid to the public sector concentrated on 
infrastructures such as electricity, transportation, telecommunications and tap water, 
Infrastructure was a focus because it had military significance and because 
improvements in these areas helped improve the investment climate (Wu 2005; Jacoby 
1965; Ho 1978, 1981)  
 
Secondly, Economic assistance also went to some sectors monopolized by the state, 
such as petroleum, aluminum, sugar refining, fertilizer, and tobacco. The US gave aid in 
these areas because American technology and capital goods best fit the needs of large-
scale producers. Thus, U.S. companies could share monopoly profits through aid-
financed procurement, technical cooperation and loans (Wu, 2005, p. 116). Second, 
U.S. aid helped strengthen state-Large Enterprises (LEs) relations through the allocation 
of aid. During the 1950s, the state used U.S. aid as rents to foster its chosen winners and 
supporters, whereas in Korea, winning a favor proved more politically oriented.   
 
It is evident in Taiwan that the state controlled a wide range of resources and used then 
as policy instruments (Chang 1965). The aim of American assistance to Taiwan during 
the five years after 1949 was to support the economy and rehabilitate Taiwan from the 
War damage (Chang 1965). However, the U.S. aid was more geared toward boosting 
the military infrastructures such as the transport, power and manufacturing capabilities 
in Taiwan. Thus, state to large enterprise (LE) relations were formed through the 
allocation of resources in Taiwan. The story however is different in Korea. As I argued 
earlier, the main difference between Korea and Taiwan is in the entrepreneurial elites. 
In Taiwan, most of state-owned enterprises were staffed by KMT members or KMT 
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affiliates as studies of (Chu, 1992; Wu 2005; Hong 2001). In Korea however, the 
entrepreneurs were freer from the control of the state and thus, were in a position to 
exert and lobby the government in exchange for the political support. In other words, 
the KMT regime in Taiwan revealed more technicalities in running its politics and 
controlled society more efficiently and eloquently. By contrast, in Korea, the first 
republic proved relatively weak in political and economic matters. Thus, I argue that 
Korea, although appearing to have strict control had only limited controls over business 
structure.  
 
Another explanation of why more balanced and equal growth of business structure 
occurred in Taiwan can be explained by the political ideology it inherited. Although the 
KMT government had a huge public sector, its anti-big business bias, based on the 
ideological origin of Sun Yet San’s teachings, may have prevent much freedom and 
power being given to the business sector (Dickson 1993).  
 
To sum up, both Korea and Taiwan became recipients of an enormous amount of U.S. 
foreign aid, similar in both quantity and quality, because of civil war. However, the use 
of foreign aid capital and related assistance programs brought Korea and Taiwan very 
different results.  
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The Chinese Civil War and the distribution of the vested properties 
Similar to Korea, Taiwanese vested enterprises also constituted the primary part of the 
postwar public sector. Two laws, “Measures for Dealing with the Enemy’s Property in 
the Recovered Areas” (1945) and “Rules to take over Japanese Property in Taiwan 
Province” (1946) (Wu 2005) declared that all properties owned by the Japanese colonial 
government and Japanese firms be reverted to the Chinese government.20  
 
The Takeover Commission, set up under the Taiwanese provincial government on 
October 25, 1946, had confiscated all properties owned by the Japanese government by 
the end of 1945. A Council for Japanese Property was established under the commission 
in January 1946 to deal with privately owned Japanese property. The task was almost 
complete in early 1947 and as Wu (2005) notes, “by the end of February, 1947, the 
KMT government had assumed control of 593 units of public property (valued at NT 
$2.94 billion), 129 firms (NT $7.2 billion). All these Japanese holdings were 
nationalized. Of the 860 industrial firms confiscated prior to 1950, 775 were Japanese-
owned (defined as a Japanese share greater than 50 percent), and 85 were Taiwanese-
owned. According to the regulations, enterprises with over 50 percent Taiwanese 
ownership were to be sold to the local shareholders of the enterprise. Of the 775 
Japanese enterprises, 376 were sold or were offered unsuccessfully for sale, and the 
other 399 were nationalized. There were four types of nationalized firms: (a) central 
government-owned (state-owned), (b) provincial government-owned, (c) joint-
ownership by the central and provincial governments and (d) owned by a city or county 
government (Wu, 2005, 4, citing Ho 1978, Chen 2000, Cummings 1984). The first two 
                                                 
20 Measures for Dealing with the Enemy’s Property in the Recovered Area was promulgated by 
the Executive Yuan (cabinet) in 1945, and Rules to take over Japanese Property in Taiwan 
promulgated by the Taiwan provincial government in 1946.  
During this time, KMT under Chiang Kai-shek was in Mainland China in struggle with the CCP. 
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types of ownership schemes accounted for the majority cases. Half the firms sold to the 
private sector were small in scale or were inappropriate for state ownership.  
 
Compared to Korea, Taiwanese policies in the treating of Japanese legacy were more 
steadfast and in control. Taiwan established strong control over vested government 
properties while ambiguity in Korean laws and policies did not allow for a higher level 
of control. Since the KMT central government in Mainland China did not move to 
Taiwan until 1949, the National Resources Commission (NRC) represented the central 
government in the appropriation of Japanese property and the running of important 
sectors. After restructuring, nine firms were city-or county-owned. This arrangement 
was the result of a compromise between the central government in China and the 
Taiwanese provincial government (Wu 2005; Ho 1978, 1980, 1981). The central 
government wanted Taiwan to be a link in a division of labor of the mainland economic 
system while the Taiwanese provincial government wanted more autonomy. The central 
government thereafter became a major force in the state-owned sectors affiliated with 
the Ministry of Economic Affairs (MOEA) (Wu 2005).  
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[Table 9: List of Publicly Owned Firms by the Japanese Returned to Taiwan after 1947] 
List of Publicly Owned Firms Restructured from Former Japanese Firms 
Former Japanese Firms Ownership Publicly Owned Firms 
Bank of Taiwan, Taiwan Savings Bank, Japan 
Sanho Bank 
 
Provincial 
 
Bank of Taiwan 
Japan Quanye Bank Provincial Taiwan Land Bank 
Taiwan Commercial and Industry Bank Provincial Taiwan First Commercial 
Bank 
Hua-nan Bank Provincial Hua-nan Bank 
Chang-hua Bank Provincial Chang-hua Bank 
Industrial Bank Provincial Taiwan Co-operative Bank 
Life Insurance companies (15) Provincial Taiwan Life Insurance, Ltd 
Goods insurance companies (13) Central Taiwan Goods Insurance, Ltd 
Unlimited companies (4) Central Taiwan Co-operative 
Corporative savings Company 
Ltd. 
Petroleum and gas companies (6) Central China Petroleum Corporation, 
Ltd.  
Japan Aluminium company Central Taiwan Aluminium 
Corporation 
Taiwan Electricity Company Central Taiwan Electricity 
Corporation 
Sugar companies (4) Central Taiwan Sugar Corporation 
Fertilizer companies (4) Central Taiwan Fertilizer Corporation 
Chemical companies (4) Central Taiwan Alkali Corporation 
Salt companies (3) Central Taiwan Salt Corporation 
Shipbuilding companies (3) Central Taiwan Shipbuilding 
Corporation  
Iron, machinery, companies (3) Central Taiwan Machinery 
Corporation 
Cement companies (11)  Central Taiwan Cement Corporation 
Papermaking companies (7) Central Taiwan Paper and Pulp 
Corporation 
Monopoly company (alcohol and cigarette) Provincial Taiwan Provincial Monopoly 
Bureau 
Camphor Bureau and company (2) Provincial Taiwan Camphor Bureau  
Agricultural and Forest Companies (45) Provincial Taiwan Agricultural and 
Forestry Corporation 
Industrial companies (163): small companies in 
textile, glass, mining, chemicals, printing, 
rubber, construction, etc 
 
 
 
Provincial 
 
 
Taiwan Industrial and Mining 
Corporation 
Source: Wu 2005, 42 
 
Table 9 accounts the list of properties that were returned to Taiwan after 1947. Notice  
the difference between the properties the ‘central government’ and the ‘provincial-  
-government’ acquired. The central government acquired mostly the major - 
 93 
-manufacturing companies such as petroleum and gas companies, Japan Aluminum 
Company, Taiwan Electricity Company, Sugar companies, and fertilizers and chemical 
companies, and the Cement Company. The provincial government acquired mostly the 
medium sized industries and Banks such as Bank of Taiwan, Taiwan Saving Bank, 
Taiwan Commercial and Industrial Banks.  
 
There was some controversy between the NRC and the provincial government led by 
Chen Yi (1935-1947) as to whether confiscated Japanese firms were to be converted 
into state-or provincial government-owned firms (Wu, 2005, 43). As a compromise, the 
NRC agreed to limit its activities to ten sectors: it enjoyed monopolies in the aluminum, 
iron and steel, and petroleum industries. Together with the provincial government, it ran 
the sugar, electricity, fertilizer, paper, cement, shipbuilding, and machinery sectors, 
holding a 60 percent share in each. There were 22 firms in the three state-owned sectors 
and 43 firms in the seven jointly owned sectors. Another 306 firms were owned by the 
provincial government:  mining, agriculture and forestry, shipping, insurance, 
construction, and finance.   
 
A look at the history of Japan’s legacy in Taiwan reveals several ways in which Korea 
and Taiwan differ. Unlike in Korea, the KMT government had full control over all the 
properties and interests it inherited and devised articulate laws to deal with these 
properties and allocate the resource equally to its industrial sectors. Korea, on the other 
hand, was limited in its handling of assets.21 Table 9 reaffirms this point. The central 
government acquired and controlled most of the core manufacturing companies while 
                                                 
21 Korea at the time was under the USMGIK’s influence and was limited in its own affairs in 
distribution of the assets. The way the laws in dealing with the government vested property got 
changed so many times, it was hardly ever put into practice. For more details on this consider 
the following literatures:    
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the provincial government got most of the financial sectors. This firm control of by the 
KMT was possible because unlike Korea, the KMT regime had relative autonomy in 
acquiring and distributing the former Japanese property. Whereas in Korea, the take 
over commission was under the influence of USMGIK and the first Republic left with 
no choice to comply with the decisions of the USMGIK in handling such enterprises. 
 
In addition, the way vested properties distributed in Korea was different to that of 
Taiwan. In Korea, under the USMGIK, the first Republic had to privatize what was 
reverted to the government (Lim 1999; Kong 1993). Often, the sales of the reverted 
properties were lower than market prices and were used as an advantage to the landlords 
when Korea underwent the land reform (Lim 1999; Kong 1993; McCure 1947). The 
properties sold to landlords than were re-purchased by the entrepreneurs in Korea 
(Kong 1993). Taiwan on the other hand, remained autonomous and the KMT regime in 
China took complete control of the property.     
 
Conclusion 
Two civil Wars were another additional factor which explained why Korea and Taiwan 
did develop the different business structure. This thesis examined the two factors of 
U.S. foreign aid and the distribution of the properties reverted from Japanese 
colonialism. Both occurred from the post World War II period and accelerated by the 
Civil Wars. For Korea, inflow of the U.S. assistance started from the USMGIK and then 
increased rapidly after the Korean War. With this inflow of aid, Korea was able to 
recover from the war damages. The process of distribution of the reverted proprieties 
started under the USMGIK guidance too. I argued that these properties distributed to the 
elites and entrepreneurs for two things: repayment to the landlords as compensation and 
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to early entrepreneurs as government subsidies to win their support during the War 
time. Most of them were selling over to the private market at below market price 
(Lyons, 91; Jones and Sakong , 270-74; Kim 1976, 465-71; Haggard, Moon, and Kim 
1991) 
 
For Taiwan, during the period between October 1945 and February 1947, KMT took 
over industries which formerly belonged to the Taiwan Governor, and confiscated 
private properties of Japanese, which was worth 11 billion Taiwan dollars. Then, the 
KMT government took over another 860 Japanese-owned or joint ventures from March 
2947 to December 1950. Some were sold to private owners but most were turned into 
state enterprises, and formed the basis of the sate enterprises in the Taiwan.  
 
The next section will examine the development of the semi-conductor industries in 
Korea and Taiwan from the late 1960s to early 1980s. I argue that examining the 
development of semi-conductor industry in Korea and Taiwan will explain the two 
things. First, the reason why Samsung, Hyundai and L.G. became the top three chaebols 
out from the 23 other chaebols in Korea. Second, examining how semiconductor 
industry developed in Taiwan will explain why SMEs have thrived in Taiwan.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 96 
 
Chapter 6:  Industrial adjustments: The Semiconductor industry in Korea and 
Taiwan 
 
[The] capitalist economy is not and cannot be stationary. Nor is it merely expanding in a steady 
manner. It is incessantly being revolutionized from within by new enterprises, such as by the 
intrusion of new commodities or new methods of production or the opening up of new 
commercial opportunities… 
      (Schumpeter 1942, 50) 
 
Introduction 
After the short period of import substitution industrialization, supported by U.S. 
economic and military aid, both Korea and Taiwan were able to take advantage of the 
liberal economic order provided by U.S. hegemonic power. To varying degrees, both 
countries have enjoyed geopolitical advantages caused by U.S. containment policy 
during the Cold War. However, economic growth based upon aggressive exports may 
have shaped the two countries to be more sensitive to changes in the international 
political economy and thus, the different path of industrial structure began to form its 
shape.  
 
Beginning as early as the 1970s, Taiwan and Korea became major targets of U.S.  Neo--
protectionist policies. These policies were further exacerbated by the open and fair trade 
pressures of the 1980s. (For information on various types of American  trade pressure 
influencing Korea and Taiwan, see Yoffie, 1983; Chan 1987). This section will discuss 
how Korea and Taiwan reacted to such international pressures as well as mounting 
domestic pressures by making industrial adjustments and developing their 
semiconductor industry.  I argue that the different business structures we see in Korea 
and Taiwan began in the mid 1970s and the semiconductor industry proves to be a 
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useful tool in measuring the departing nature of industrial structure in Korea and 
Taiwan.  
 
Prior researches in the semiconductor industrial developments suggest the two things: 
(a) Both Korea and Taiwan have developed an excellent semi-conductor industry. 
Korea sought to develop mass production capability of standardized memory products, 
DRAM in particular while Taiwan sought its own niche markets by emphasizing design 
technologies and Application Specific Integrated Circuit (ASIC) products. (b) Korea 
and Taiwan have differed in their approaches in developing their semi-conductor 
industries (Matthews and Cho 2002; Cheng 2001; Hong 1997; Wu 2005; Cho, Kim, 
Rhee 1998; Suraze-Villa and Han 1998; Byun 1994; Bailey, Zitzewitz, Bostwith, 
Westphal 1998; Brown and Linden 2006; Ranis 2000,).  
 
Based on prior researches, this thesis will trace the developmental history of the 
semiconductor industries in Korea and Taiwan to find the relationship between the 
semiconductor development and business structural difference in two countries. I argue 
that in Korea, the growth of semiconductor industry reinforced the Chaebol domination. 
From the point where Samsung and Hyundai developed their first semiconductors, the 
influence of government became less evident. In Taiwan, however, the growth of 
semiconductor industry was virtually led by the government. From the start of its 
industries to the creation of the first semi-conductor product, the government got 
involved in every step, thus creating the diffused industrial structures.  
 
More interestingly, the government policy toward SMEs from the mid-1970s, (Wu 
2005) coincides with the policy of emphasizing the export market to sell the 
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semiconductor products as these were the times when the KMT government in Taiwan 
began by lowering entry barriers across industries (Wu 2005, p. 286).  
I argue that the changes in international political economy have shifted the focus of 
industrial strategies in Korea and Taiwan. In Korea, established entrepreneurs initiated a 
shift in industrial strategy and initiated the semiconductor industrialization while in 
Taiwan, motivation came from the state. The case study of the development of the semi-
conductor industry in Korea and Taiwan will illustrate how these same responses yield 
different industrial structures in Korea and Taiwan.      
 
Development paths in the semiconductor industry: South Korea 
In February 1983, Korea’s most famous businessmen, Lee Byung-chul, the founder and 
chairman of Samsung, in a famous statement, said that “Samsung intended to become a 
world player in memory chip production” (Byun 1994, 706). He was prepared to invest 
up to 100 billion won ($1.33 million in U.S) to back this assertion.  Less than two years 
later, Samsung shocked the world with its 64K DRAM, produced at its gleaming new 
wafer-fabrication plant at Kiheung. Within two years, it was making profits from the 
256K DRAM. Samsung had emerged as the world’s number one producer of DRAM, 
generating enormous wealth for itself and Korea. Lees’s fellow chaebol chairmen were 
quick to follow. In April 1983, barely a month after Lee’s announcement, Chung Chu-
young, chairman of Hyundai, made a similar commitment on behalf of his company.  
 
The story of Korea’s entry into high-technology industries like semiconductors is one of 
fervent entrepreneurs taking extraordinary risks and countless engineers making efforts 
beyond what is required. However, the real story lies with the government and its 
institutions which also played a role, but minor. The root of Korea’s success in 
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semiconductors (and thus, the growth of Chaebols) goes back many years to earlier 
preparatory   phases of developing its knowledge –intensive industries.  Although the 
Korean semiconductor phenomenon took off in the mid-1980s and achieve world-class 
status in the 1990s, its roots can be traced back to the 1960 and 1970s. In the 1960s, the 
Korean government opened up its market to the world by pursuing an export-led growth 
strategy and in the 1970s, leading Chaebols established their electronics businesses.   
 
The development phases 
The first phase (1965-72) is characterized by an influx of foreign investments for the 
semiconductor assembly and packaging industry. The development of Korean 
semiconductor industry was favored by the rapid diffusion of the production technology 
from advanced countries, especially in the United Sates. The segmentation of the 
production line meant that manufacturers could set up their assembly factories in less 
developed countries and thus gain an advantage from the cheap labor costs while more 
technological intensive sector remaining in the head-quarter. Korean chaebols like Lee 
byung Chul of the Samsung and Chung Joo young of the Hyundai saw this opportunity 
and ventured in the process of setting up the assembly line in Korea (Suarez-Villa and 
Han 1990; Matthew and Cho 2002). 
 
The state in this period devised many plans to attract foreign investment and promoted 
electronics exports. Thus, the Korea’s semiconductor industry began with U.S. 
companies like Fairchild, Signetics, and Motorola setting up assembly lines.  Feeling 
the first waves of competitive pressure from Japan, these companies were looking to 
invest in low-cost assembly operations abroad, initially in Hong Kong, and then in 
Taiwan and Korea. Fairchild had invested in such facilities in Hong Kong in 1963, and 
 100 
it was interested in establishing similar operations in Korea and Taiwan. A small 
American company, Komi, which invested in transistor/diode production facilities in 
Korea in 1965, provided the founding date for the country’s semiconductor industry. 
Companies such as Komi not only provided investment money but also technologies.    
 
From 1970s, as the electronics industries grew rapidly, the Korean business sector 
realized the limits of assembly lines operation. In order to make more profit, 
entrepreneurs in Korea began, from 1974 onward, investing in the semi-conduction 
industry. Korea’s leading enterprises, like Samsung, began acquiring semiconductor 
companies like Korean-semiconductor and the Korean branch of Fairchild. Samsung, 
with imported production equipment from the U.S., began to make huge investments in 
the industry. By 1978, Samsung had successfully acquired   all the necessary equipment 
for the production of wafer-fabrication DRAMs. Meanwhile, Kum Sung (old name for 
L.G. electronics) also took over Korean-semiconductor and collaborated with AT&T to 
formed production factories in Korea. The other chaebols like Hyundai, made little or 
no effort in investing at this stage. 
 
The government’s role 
With these investments of Chaebols, the government of Korea started to devise an 
electronics development plan under the 5 year economic development plan. Thus, while 
other parts of the plan were initiated and govern by the government, the electronics 
sector was spearheaded by the Chaebols. The policy objective from the government was 
to provide necessary assistance to private research and developments (R&D) and assist 
in the development of the semiconductor industry by providing government credits and 
unlimited access to the loans. However, most of the R&D was carried out by private 
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enterprises through Samsung, L.G. and Hyundai, illustrating their competency and risk 
taking measures, while the government assisted by providing low interest rate loans and 
operations of some state-run R & D facilities.  
 
In particular, the Korean government relaxed its controls over foreign investment from 
1965 onwards by introducing the ‘Foreign Capital Inducement Law’ (1965) (Hong 
1997). The US government also provided incentives in the form of exemption from US 
tariffs for goods assembled abroad. Further, the U.S. provided encouragement for local 
investment in Korea in recognition of military assistance rendered in Vietnam. In short, 
the environment was excellent for the development of the semiconductor industry.  
 
After relations between Korea and Japan were “normalized” in the mid 1960s, Japanese 
electronics MNC also established assembly and test facilities in Korea, starting with 
Toshiba and Sanyo in 1969. By 1973, there were at least seven Japanese facilities, 
operated by such firms as Toko, Rohm and Sanken. The Toshiba investment was 
critical, being the first between Japan and Korea post-occupation. Initial discussions to 
establish a germanium transistor plant had been aborted in 1967 (germanium was 
becoming an obsolete technology), but a joint venture to establish a silicon transistor 
plant in 1969 bore fruit. The plant was established at Kumi, then a farming area – but it 
was rapidly provided with all essential infrastructures under personal orders from the 
President. Kumi was the base for Korea’s rapid expansion of the semiconductor 
industry.  
 
The Korean government favoured these multinational investments because of the 
contribution made by exported chips to foreign exchange earnings. These earnings 
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could then be ploughed back into further employment, contributing to a labour-intensive 
phase of industrialization. The primary goal of the sectoral plan was accomplished by 
1978 as domestication of   semiconductor manufacturing was achieved. The plan aimed 
to develop 41 components and 16 finished products in electronics. Among them, 9 items 
were related to wafer fabrication and computers (Matthew and Cho 2002; Hong 1997). 
The government planned to invest $150 million in facilities and $58 million in R&D. 
The Kumi Industrial Complex was to be expanded in order to invite private 
participation (Kim, Lee, J.J. Lee 1987; Park, Kim, Joo, and Yoon 1987).  
 
Organizational changes within the Korean government were initiated in order to meet 
these goals. An electronics industry division was created within the MTI in 1973, which 
was formerly a subdivision under the electrical industry division. In 1977, the 
electronics industry division expanded into three divisions (electronic components, 
home appliance, and industrial equipment) and was located under the newly created 
Precession Machinery Industry Bureau. In 1978 the Electrical and Electronics Industry 
Bureau was created within the MTI, and the three divisions related to the electronics 
industry were relocated under this new bureau. Later in 1983, the Industrial Equipment 
Division was renamed as   the Electronics Policy Division and the Information Industry 
Division was created. Since then, the Electrical and Electronics Industry Bureau has 
become the core agency in industrial policy-making for the electronics and 
semiconductor industries. In December 1991, the Electronic Components Division was 
renamed as the Semiconductor Industry Division which illustrated the increasing 
importance of semiconductors in the Korean economy.  
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The MTI also tried to form a unified industry association in order to have more effective 
responses from the private sector. Responding to this state initiative, private 
manufacturers formed the Electronics Industry Association of Korea (EIAK) in 1976 by 
consolidating the two existing electronics industry associations, the Korean Electronics 
Industry Cooperatives and the Electronics Industry Export Cooperatives. In 1979 the 
EIAK absorbed the industry promotion function of the Fine Instrument Center, and in 
1980, it absorbed the import recommendation function of the Electric Products 
Manufacturers Association. As a result, the EIAK became a powerful industry 
association for the electronics industry in Korea (Suarez-Villa, Han 1990, 276-277; 
EIAK 1989).  
 
The government in this period also pursued various research projects through state-run 
research institutes. In 1975 semiconductor technology was selected as a top priority 
research project of the KIST. In 1976 the Korea Institute of Electronics Technology 
(KIET) was created in the Kumi Industrial Complex under the joint sponsorship of the 
state and the private sector. The primary goal of the KIET was to support R&D in high-
tech areas. With loans from the IBRD, the KIET pursued utility projects within the 
industrial complex as well as various research projects for the private sector. Under the 
state integration policy on research institutes, the electronic technology research 
function of the KIET was absorbed by the newly created Electronic Technology 
Research Institute (ETRI) in 1981. The ETRI absorbed the Communication Technology 
Research Institute in 1985 (EIAK 1989, 143-5). However, the role of state-operated 
R&D facility was minimal compare to the private R&D facilities that Samsung, 
Hyundai and L.G. operated. So the role of the government remained at continuing its 
financial support for electronics manufacturers as a part of the heavy and chemical 
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industrialization program. In addition to tax reduction and tariff deduction, special 
purpose loans (policy loans) were available to semiconductor manufacturers such as the 
NIF loans and long-term credits from the Korean Development Bank (KDB).  
 
Summary 
The developmental processes of the semiconductor industry in Korea have been very 
much dependent on the entrepreneurs. The path for the development of a semi-
conductor industry can be credited to high risk-taking entrepreneurship. Overall, it is 
evident that the semiconductor industry allowed few Chaebols like Samsung, Hyundai 
and L.G. gained more control and power over the government in certain industrial 
sectors. With the amount of revenue and employment opportunities the Chaebols bring, 
the government simply had to aid them by go along with what the Chaebols and setting 
up the institutions to aid them.  
 
In addition, the development of the semi-conductor industry proves that the statist and 
developmental theory are wrong in assuming that the Korean government played 
leading role in industrialization in Korea. Certain sectors like electronics industry was 
initiated and led by Chaebols in Korea. The government simply assisted the 
development by providing credit-loans and complying with the demands of Chaebols.   
 
The next section will look at Taiwan’s development of semiconductor industry.  
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Development paths in the semiconductor industry: Taiwan 
  
Introduction  
In the early 1970s, the world economy, including the export-dependent Taiwanese 
economy, went into a serious recession (Jeon 1994). Oil prices had increased 
exponentially because of the first Oil Shock in the fall of 1973. To make things worse, 
most advanced industrial countries began to suffer from stagflation (Barsky and Kilian 
2001). In the midst of these economic difficulties, Taiwan’s major export items such as 
textiles and footwear began to lose international competitiveness due to emerging 
competition from less developed countries. Furthermore, neo-protectionist policy 
measures adopted by advanced industrial countries also contributed to reduced demand 
for Taiwanese exports.  
 
It was in the middle of this economic recession that some Taiwanese high-ranking 
public officials began to think about industrial upgrading (Mathews and Cho 2002; 
Meaney 1994; Hong 1997). The electronics industry, including semiconductors, was 
selected as one of the strategic sectors to be promoted for future industrial adjustment. 
Unlike in Korea, where Chaebols took the opportunity to expand their business by 
investing heavily in the semi-conductor, SMEs industries in Taiwan were utilized by the 
KMT government to further expand the industry. Then later when  
 
The early 1970s also was the time when Taiwan’s relative position in international 
relations deteriorated   due to the dramatic normalization treaty between the US and 
China. Taiwan’s competitive edge in   labor-intensive industries was challenged by   
growing competition from other developing countries. In an effort to adjust to the 
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changing economic and political environments both domestically and abroad, the 
semiconductor industry was selected as a strategic sector to be developed by the KMT 
government in Taiwan along with several other industries described above.  
 
However, the semiconductor industry required enormous financial resources just to 
start, and a continued commitment of large investments for R&D and facilities. The 
extremely short life cycles of semiconductor devices (about three to four years) creates 
a very high entrance barrier to small firms unless they have extraordinarily sophisticated 
technologies. Taiwan in the early 1970s, however, did not possess enough technical 
sophistication to launch an independent semiconductor industry. When its first 
semiconductor project started around 1974, the founding fathers (Dr. Yun-hsuan Sun, 
the Minister of Economic Affairs and Dr. Wen-yuan Pan who organized the TAC in the 
US, just to name a few), of the industry were fully aware that there was no alternative 
but for the state to pursue this project because of the limited size of private firms and 
their low technology level (Matthews and Cho 2002; Chang and Tsai 2006).  
 
Development phases 
Meaney (1994) divides the development of Taiwan’s semiconductor industry into four 
different phases according to major projects and achievements (Meaney 1994, ). The 
phases are: (1) the creation of the Industrial Technology Research Institute (ITRI) and 
the Electronic Research Service Organization (ERSO) under the MOEA (1974-78). (2) 
The creation of the United Microelectronics Company (UMC), the Science and 
Technology Advisory Group (STAG), and the Hsinchu Science-Based Industrial Park 
(HSIP) (1979-83). (3) The adoption of the Very Large Scale Integrated Circuit 
Company (VLSI) project and the formation of the Taiwanese Semiconductor 
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Manufacturing Company (TSMC) (1984-89). (4) the adoption of the submicron project 
and the growth of private firms (1990-present), (Meaney 1994).   
 
These four different phases illustrate a well-planned and highly developed network of 
institutions for collaborations (IFCs) in Taiwan. In addition, the big universities  that are 
located in key industrial areas, for instance, Tsing-Hua National University and Chiao 
Tung National University located at the Hsinchu Science Park, and state-sponsored 
research institutes that play key roles in the economy, most notably is the ITRI (Ranis 
2002; Wang 1995). The state created integrated institutions to develop the semi-
conductor industry and the Taiwanese firms benefited from it.   
 
Taiwan’s semiconductor industry has transitioned through three main stages of growth. 
The preparatory stage started in the 1960s when Taiwan positioned its economy for 
export-led growth mainly through small and medium private firms involved in contract 
manufacturing relations with U.S. and European manufacturing firms. Through the 
establishment of an export-processing zone in 1965, Taiwan attracted contracts from 
U.S. electronics and semiconductor firms seeking to invest in low-cost manufacturing in 
Asia as the worldwide Integrated Circuit (IC) market sales increased.  In 1966, U.S. 
based General Instrument Microelectronics established a semiconductor packaging 
business in Taiwan and became the first semiconductor company in Taiwan (Chang and 
Tsai 2000).  
 
By the 1970s, Taiwan was successful at transferring global technologies into 
capabilities in its semiconductor industry. The ITRI played significant roles in 
technology developments. The ERSO was subsequently formed out of the ITRI and 
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charged by the government to promote technology transfer from the world’s best to 
Taiwan. Then the Taiwanese government quickly responded to this move by 
establishing Export Processing Zones (EPZ), and as a result, several US semiconductor 
firms entered into Taiwan (Hong 1997). 
 
By 1981, competitiveness in the semiconductor industry greatly increased along with a 
rise in prominence of the industry at the global level. An increased partnership between 
government and industry increased the role of private firms in the industry. By 1995 the 
industry had developed fully with over 180 firms and had a large share of the world 
market (Johnston 2000; Matthews 1997).  
 
The semiconductor industry requires enormous investments for R&D and facilities as 
well as a large skilled work force. Due to the enormous start-up costs and long-term 
view on profits, no private firm in Taiwan was willing to invest in the semiconductor 
business until 1988. Therefore, the Taiwanese state had to assume a dominant and 
pervasive role as both planner and producer. The Taiwan state has been the major 
source of R&D investments, marketing channels, and work force training. Until 
recently, all major R&D projects for the semiconductor industry have been planned and 
administered by the state through ITRI/ERSO and other related state agencies (). The 
private sector began their major investments after the 1988-89 periods, but most   
private investments have been devoted to the expansion of facilities.    
 
How Semiconductor industry expanded the SMEs 
The first interaction between the state and the private sector occurred when the issue of 
forming the United Microelectronics Company (UMC) became an utmost concern to 
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those who pushed for the semiconductor project (Mathews and Cho 2000). The decision 
to create a public-private joint venture was clearly caused by the presence of small and 
medium business structure, where individual firms could not readily overcome the high 
entrance barriers of the industry  
 
The ITRI and the ERSO emphasized developing design technologies that would be 
appropriate to small businesses.  They provided various manpower training programs 
for the employees of   private firms. Later, many of those who were trained at the (ITRI) 
and  (ERSO) opened their own businesses, mostly small independent design houses in 
the HSIP, which was established in 1980 (Hong 1997 Jonston 2000; Matthew 1997). 
Due to the growing number of design houses, the high-tech circle in Taiwan decided to 
create another joint venture, called the TSMC, as a pure foundry, which became the 
biggest semiconductor fabricating company in Taiwan as of 1993. Interestingly enough, 
no local Taiwanese capitalists were willing to participate in the TSMC project despite 
the impressive success of the UMC business. This clearly shows   constraints imposed 
upon the state and the private sector by the small and medium-size business structure in 
Taiwan.  
 
In addition to the two join ventures, the UMC and TSMC, the state helped to induce 
private (SMEs) participation in the semiconductor industry through a number of 
channels. For example, ten wafer fabricating firms operating as of 1993 are linked to the 
ITRI and   ERSO in one way or another. As explained earlier, the TSMC and the UMC 
were directly created by the state by spinning off a part of ERSO’s research and 
marketing teams. The former created all other local Taiwanese firms such as Winbond, 
HMC, Holtek, ADT, and AMPi.  Employees of the ITRI and   ERSO and their 
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technologies were directly provided by ERSO. The only exceptions are the firms that 
were born through foreign direct investments; either wholly owned by foreign 
companies (Macronix) or a foreign-local joint venture (TI-Acer).  
 
Conclusion 
The development of the semiconductor industry was another factor this thesis has 
examined. It is noted that both Korea and Taiwan initiated developing the semi-
conductor industrialization within similar time and under similar setting. However, 
there are two noticeable differences in their semi-conductor development. First is the 
products they manufacture. Korea sought to develop mass production capability of 
standardized memory products, DRAM in particular while Taiwan sought its own niche 
markets by emphasizing design technologies and Application Specific Integrated Circuit 
(ASIC) products. Second is the difference in their approaches of the industrialization. 
Then, this thesis traced the overall developmental history of the semi-conductor 
industry in Korea and Taiwan and found two important distinctions. First difference lies 
in the approach in Korea and Taiwan’s developmental strategy. In Korea, 
semiconductor industry was initiated and started by few cheabols who can manage in 
bring the foreign investments. Samsung started this process first then Hyundai, L.G. 
followed the Samsung in developing the industry. The government also played their part 
by pouring subsidized loans and creating special industrial zone like Kumi to bring 
more foreign direct investments and creating state-run R&D institutions like KAIST. 
Overall, the development of the industry initiated largely by the few chaebols in Korea. 
This exacerbated the industrial concentration in Korea as the only few business 
conglomerates were capable to develop this high-tech industry and reaped huge profits 
which reinforced the growth of chaaeobls.  
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In Taiwan, the story of semi-conductor industry begins at the state-level. Contrast to 
Korea, it was the government initiating and created the industry. The semiconductor 
industry was one of the strategic sectors to be promoted for future industrial adjustment. 
Unlike in Korea where Chaebols took the opportunity and expanded their business, 
Taiwan had well-planned and integrated institutions to develop the semiconductor 
industry from the beginning. The decision to create a public-private joint venture was 
clearly caused by the presence of small and medium business structure, where 
individual firms could not readily overcome the high entrance of the industry. Facing 
these obstacles, the government initiated state-private joint ventures by forming the 
United Microelectronics Company.  
 
Decision to create a public-private be seen by the following measures. The ITRI and 
ERSO emphasis in developing design-technologies that would be appropriate to small 
business, such as various manpower training program for the employees of the private 
firms. In addition, the two joint ventures, the UMC and TSMC, the state helped to 
induce private (SMEs) participation in the semiconductor industry through s number of 
channels. For example, ten wafter fabricating firms operating as of 1993 are linked to 
the ITRI and ERSO. 
 
Thus, in Taiwan, the semiconductor industry developed under the strong state influence 
and sound institutional settings. Under the strong state influence, the semiconductor 
industry in Taiwan shows different paths of growth. Compared to Korea, the 
semiconductor manufacturing is more dispersed and diffused by deliberate state 
planning. Despite its small size, Taiwan, ranks far ahead of South Korea in 
semiconductor patents in the number of semiconductor patents released annually (U.S. 
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Patent and Trademark Office 2008,  Electronic Information Products Division, Patent 
Technology Monitoring Branch (PTMB), http://www.uspto.gov/ ).  
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Chapter 7: Conclusion 
 
This thesis has analyzed the different business structures in Korea and Taiwan. In doing 
so, it has taken a different approach from the prior ‘institutional-embededness’ 
framework limited in the ability to explain why different business structure has been 
developed in Korea and Taiwan. I argued, under the ‘institutional-embededness’ 
framework, the development of different business structure in Korea and Taiwan can 
not be explained fully. This is because the ‘institutional-embeddedness’ examines only 
the states and their institutions as the sole independent variable while leaving other 
important variations as having minimal or no affect at all. This thesis set out to 
overcome such limit by re-organizing the theoretical framework to explain why Korea 
and Taiwan has developed different industrial structures. The findings of this thesis 
suggest that business structure in Korea have developed in different fashion to that of 
Taiwan.  In Korea, vibrant interplay between governments to business conglomerates 
was visible while in Taiwan, restricted and central governance guided and controlled the 
business sectors. This difference can help to identify the organization of the different 
business structures we see in Korea and Taiwan.   
 
In this concluding chapter, I will summarize the findings of this research. I will then 
explore the implications of these findings for the explanation of the different business 
structure in Korea and Taiwan. Following this, the limitations of this thesis will be 
discussed, as well as opportunities and avenues for further research.    
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Summary of findings 
Through scoping relevant literatures, both primary and secondary, it was possible to 
identify several areas in which causes of different business structure in Korea and 
Taiwan can be explained. Then, this thesis has surveyed published primary literatures 
that are relevant and identified following the three theoretical frameworks of statist / 
developmental theory, new institutional economics theory, and new economic sociology 
influenced most of the writings.  
 
On this basis, it was possible then to formalize the theoretical framework for this thesis. 
As argued earlier, this thesis assimilates close to the Fields’ (1995) ‘institutional-
embeddedness’. However, two modifications made, I argue, have made the framework 
more fluent in explaining the origins of different business structures in Korea and 
Taiwan. Thus, I proposed a modified framework ‘progressive institutiona-
embeddedness’ to account the progression of institutional embeddedness in Korea to 
account how institutional settings grew along with the business conglomerates. This 
theoretical framework proved highly informative.   
 
Firstly, it became clear that there was difference in the overall political condition 
between Korea and Taiwan, influencing Korea and Taiwan to take different measures 
toward the business sector. Because of the political weakness largely derived from the 
lack in political support basis within domestic, the First Republic and the ruling party 
(Democratic Party) comprised with the leading social-elite group.  
 
The Third Republic, which came to power through the military coup of May 16th 1961, 
also suffered largely from lack of political support base. To overcome this deficit, the 
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Republic promised to deliver economic growth and the general well-being to the 
population of Korea. To do so, Park Chung Hee depended heavily on chaebols to meet 
the goal. The economic institutional arrangements were geared toward to enable the 
business sectors to expand their operations from import substitution industrialization to 
the export-oriented industrialization.  
 
The Fifth Republic followed similar procedure of the Third Republic and extended its 
loans and credits to Chaebols. By this time, chaebols grew to be so powerful that the 
government tried to control them by KAA act. However, as explained, the government 
largely failed to contro Chaebols. This is evident by the example of continuation of the 
subsidized loan flows to Cheabols and the government bailing out Cheabols.  
 
For Taiwan, such a weakness in political condition was less visible. Although the KMT 
regime in Taiwan faced number of crises that challenged the political ability, the KMT 
government dominated the politics in Taiwan for four decades.  
 
The findings were as I suspected. The KMT regime in Taiwan by expressing itself as 
the “sole legitimate government” of China, remained in strong power by countering 
political opposition as exmplifed by the February incident and the strict control the 
government applied to the business sector.  
 
Overall, the politically weak governments in Korea sought business conglomerates to 
substantiate their weakness while in Taiwan, such a measure was not necessary as the 
KMT regime enjoyed strong political power and the government ran their own 
enterprises and controlled politics as well as economics.  
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Two civil Wars were another additional factor which explained why Korea and Taiwan 
did develop the different business structure. This thesis examined the two factors of 
U.S. foreign aid and the distribution of the properties reverted from Japanese 
colonialism. Both occurred from the post World War II period and accelerated by the 
Civil Wars. For Korea, inflow of the U.S. assistance started from the USMGIK and then 
increased rapidly after the Korean War. With this inflow of aid, Korea was able to 
recover from the war damages. The process of distribution of the reverted proprieties 
started under the USMGIK guidance too. I argued that these properties distributed to the 
elites and entrepreneurs for two things: repayment to the landlords as compensation and 
to early entrepreneurs as government subsidies to win their support during the War 
time. Most of them were sell over to the private market at below market price. 
 
Since 1949, the KMT government regulated strong measures in industrial sector. I 
argued this with the following evidence: first, the visible barrier between the SOEs and 
the private enterprises. The allocation of the U.S. assistance depicts the widened 
monopolistic power of the state. In the category of planned economic aid from the 
United States, 49.7 per cent was distributed to state electrical power and transportation 
enterprises, 24.2 per cent was to state industrial and mining enterprises.  
 
The development of the semiconductor industry was another factor this thesis has 
examined. It is noted that both Korea and Taiwan initiated developing the semi-
conductor industrialization within similar time and under similar setting. However, 
there are two noticeable differences in their semi-conductor development.  
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In Taiwan, the semiconductor industry developed under the strong state influence and 
sound institutional settings. Under the strong state influence, the semiconductor industry 
in Taiwan shows a different path of growth. Compared to Korea, the semiconductor 
manufacturing is more dispersed and diffused by deliberate state planning. Despite its 
small size, Taiwan, ranks far ahead of South Korea in semiconductor patents in the 
number of semiconductor patents released annually (U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, 
Electronic Information Products Division, Patent Technology Monitoring Branch 
(PTMB), http://www.uspto.gov/ ).  
 
The Lessons to be learn: implication of the thesis. 
This thesis has studied the path of different industrial structure development in Korea 
and Taiwan. Analysis from many literatures in the fields of developmental study, 
particularly the NICs have been useful and inspirational. The findings in this thesis 
suggest additional factors must be considered to explore in the comparison of the 
development of business structures. Taiwan and Korea had similar settings and 
conditions in developments. Under these similar settings, they have developed a 
uniquely different industrial structure. One developed a structure of more clustered, 
organized business structures while the other developed relatively diffused industrial 
structure.  
 
However, both countries have made remarkable economic growth and subsequently, 
developments. The focus of this thesis was exploring other possible explanations and 
evaluates their weights in explaining the development of different industrial structures 
in Korea and Taiwan. The findings of this thesis suggested the limitation of Karl Fields’ 
‘institutional-embeddedness’ model to explain fully why Korea sought the chaebols 
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oriented developments while Taiwan developed more dispersed yet tightly organized 
industrial structures. Many of the prior studies argued that it was the particular 
institutional settings that created and developed the different business structure in Korea 
and Taiwan. They argue, that the Korean government has intervened in the allocation of 
resources creating an entrenched policy bureaucracy that controls the means for plan 
implementation. The institutional setup provides domestic market protection, 
implements industrial targeting and issue permits of entry in many industries and 
foreign loan guarantees. Kuznets, even calls “Korean Inc” (Kuznets 1977). 
 
Taiwan government uses a medium term economic plan that sets macroeconomic 
targets and formulates sector investments plans, unlike Korea however, these plans are 
indicative. The planners have had little authority and limited access to policy 
instruments such as credit allocations. There is no institutional networks link the 
economic bureaucracy with the private sector.  
 
However, this thesis argued against of the conventional argument by providing three 
counter-arguments. First factor examined displays the weakness in Korean politics 
affecting government’s choice in selecting the political support basis. Korea did not 
have interventionist, strong bureaucratic control able to control the means for plan 
implementation. Rather, it was the governments’ need in that drove such measure, often 
leveraging the Chaebols in return for the state objectives. The allocation of the U.S. 
foreign assistance and the distribution of the government vested properties in Rhee ear 
clearly demonstrates incompetency of the Korean bureaucrats. In Parks’ era, it was 
much the same. To drive economy to in compensation for his illegitimate movement, 
Park also needed Chaebols help and advice on the economic matters and allocated 
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subsidized loans and government credits. It was not like the developmentally or 
institutionalist w argues. It was more of an inter-play between government and business 
where each party mutually complimenting each other.  
 
The Taiwan governments’ role with the business sector also contradicts with, according 
to the findings of this thesis. The findings of this theiss argue that it was infact, Taiwan 
that was a strong state with able bureaucrats allocating and distributing the resources in 
sound manner. The political leadership was determined to prevent the concentration of 
resources in private hands, as it believed that a small group of powerful businessmen 
who controlled a large share of private resources and the financial system had caused its 
downfall on the mainland.  Thus, the KMT government in Taiwan did its best to stay 
distanced to the business group politically. But economically, KMT government 
revealed compatibility and was able to influence the business sectors using allocation of 
resources as a policy mechanisms. This was illustrated in the allocation of the U.S. 
assistance and the handling of the Japanese reverted properties.  
 
Claims that the KMT government in Taiwan had less effective institutional settings was 
also refuted by the examination of the development of semiconductor industry in 
Taiwan. I argued that in Taiwan, more effective and integrated institutions have 
developed to enable the private sector in developing the semiconductors.  
 
Limitations  
The relevance of this thesis in explaining the variance of business structure using 
modified framework should not disguise he fact that it has its limitations or at least, 
there will be limitations that others will perceive of it.  
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Therefore, to lessen these, a discussion of these limitations will be provided, to both 
highlight them as well as defend them where possible. First, the formulation of the 
theoretical framework itself and the variables for the study, was based on material 
produced in the 1980s and early 1990s. I have tried to incorporate more recent 
materials, but cannot guarantee that I have comprehensively covered all the literatures 
related to the topic. Therefore, the progressive institutional model I proposed may have 
been subject to change. If it is not, the validity and worth of this inquiry stands. 
However, even if it has changed, this inquiry should still have a utility. It will at least 
have provided an exploration attempt to study how different business structures 
developed in Korea and Taiwan. In addition, any future formulations of this kind may 
be informed by the approach of this study. 
 
Second, the variables selected for the study are not inclined to quantification. Although 
this is not a weakness in itself, it does mean that the cause and effect relationship 
between the independent and dependent variables are lacking ‘substantial-proof’. 
However, it is a difficult task to formulated quantifiable variables based on the nature of 
the study.  
 
Finally, the thesis does not comprehensively analyze all areas associated with the 
selected variables. Firstly, the implications of the ‘political conditions’ on development 
of different business structure is only one small aspect of how political structures really 
worked in Korea and Taiwan. Moreover, the relationship between the business and 
politics is only a small aspect happened in Korea and Taiwan, therefore cannot be 
generalized and be applicable to the study of other country. Secondly, the implication of 
the Civil War also has the limited implications to the condition of Korea and Taiwan. 
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Their implications for the particular mode of operation on the different business 
development in Korea and Taiwan also is limited as the discussion looks at only the 
limited aspects of ‘financing’ the business and did not look at other social functions 
which are not analyzed. These includes, labor organization, land distribution and so 
forth.    
 
Finally, although analysis of the semi-conductor industrialization indicated an 
additional explanation of why the few Chaebols grew powerful and the expansion of 
Taiwan’s private business (SMEs), the explanation cannot answer the cause of the 
different business structure in Korea and Taiwan.    
 
However, in defense of the options taken here, it must be state that the decision 
concerning these variables was based on the model I proposed itself. If the relevance of 
this study is pertinent only to its formulation, then that is sufficient since that was the 
original purpose. The incorporation of other variables will undoubtedly be of value, but 
for a more comprehensive study, that is well beyond the objectives of this.  
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Final remarks 
It is suggested that to account the true dimension of the different business structure in 
Korea and Taiwan, one has to account not only the government and its institutional 
factors, but also needs to consider how such a government and institutional settings 
have arrived.  
 
The study of business structure development in Korea and Taiwan is still an ongoing 
debate in the field of comparative political economy. The findings in this thesis will add 
yet another explanation to account why Korea and Taiwan have developed different 
business structure despite many similar conditions.  
 
The findings in this thesis are suggestive and may hint the readers towards more 
insightful study of in the politics and business structure.  
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